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DUTY-TO-PROTECT CLAIMS BY INMATES 
AFTER THE PRISON RAPE ELIMINATION 
ACT 
David K. Ries∗ 
Roderick Johnson was on probation in Texas for a nonviolent 
burglary offense.1 In January 2000, Johnson’s probation was 
revoked and, within nine months, he was transferred to a 
maximum-security prison.2 The prison officials responsible for 
Johnson’s cell assignment there “knew that Johnson was 
homosexual and possessed an effeminate manner,”3 but placed him 
in the prison’s general population after telling him “‘we don’t 
protect punks on this farm.’”4 Soon afterward a prison gang 
asserted ownership over Johnson and forced him into daily sex 
acts.5 Throughout his eighteen-month stay in prison, Johnson 
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1 Roderick Keith Johnson v. Gary Johnson, 385 F.3d 503, 512 (5th Cir. 
2004). 
2 Id. 
3 Id. 
4 Id. 
5 Adam Liptak, Ex-Inmate’s Suit Offers View into Sexual Slavery in 
Prisons, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 16, 2004, at A1. 
“The Crips already had a homosexual that was with them,” Mr. 
Johnson explained. “The Gangster Disciples, from what I understand, 
hadn’t had a homosexual under them in a while. So that’s why I was 
automatically, like, given to them.” According to court papers and 
[Johnson’s] own detailed account, the Gangster Disciples and then 
other gangs treated Mr. Johnson as a sex slave. They bought and sold 
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“sought help from guards, filed numerous ‘life-endangerment’ 
forms, and wrote letters to prison administrators,” but he remained 
in the facility’s general population.6 During those eighteen months, 
Johnson was passed among various prison gangs, and rape became 
a routine part of his prison life.7 
Prison rape, disturbingly a running joke in popular culture,8 is 
conservatively estimated to occur 12,000 times a year and affect 
nearly thirteen percent of the nation’s prisoners.9 In 1994, in 
Farmer v. Brennan,10 the Supreme Court held that no legitimate 
penological purpose is served by allowing rape to occur within 
                                                          
him, and they rented him out. Some sex acts cost $5, others $10. 
Id. 
6 Johnson, 385 F.3d at 513. 
7 Liptak, supra note 5, at A1. “‘I was forced into oral sex and anal sex on a 
daily basis,’ said Mr. Johnson, who has been living in a boarding house [in 
Austin, Texas] since his release in December [2003]. ‘Not for a month or two. 
For, like, 18 months.’” Id. 
8 Sabrina Qutb & Lara Stemple, Selling a Soft Drink, Surviving Hard Time 
Just What Part of Prison Rape Do You Find Amusing?, S.F. CHRON., June 9, 
2002, at D2, available at http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?file=/ 
chronicle/archive/2002/06/09/IN181350.DTL. 
9 The Prison Rape Elimination Act, 42 U.S.C. § 15601(2) (2005) 
(“[E]xperts have conservatively estimated that at least 13% of the inmates in the 
United States have been sexually assaulted in prison”). The estimate of 12,000 
rapes comes from the corrections industry. Eli Lehrer, A Blind Eye, Still Turned: 
Getting Serious About Prison Rape, NAT’L REVIEW, June 2, 2003, at 10. “Even 
if this is the actual number, it still represents more rapes than are reported 
annually against women in New York City, Los Angeles, Philadelphia, Boston, 
San Diego, and Phoenix combined.” Id. Higher estimates have been made. 
Extrapolating from the findings of a study of Nebraska’s prison system by 
Professor Cindy Struckman-Johnson of the University of South Dakota to the 
national level, Human Rights Watch cites a total of more than 140,000 inmates 
who have been anally raped while in prison. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, NO 
ESCAPE: MALE RAPE IN U.S. PRISONS 130 (2001) [hereinafter NO ESCAPE], 
available at http://www.hrw.org/ reports/2001/prison. These rapes occur within 
a national prison system of federal and state facilities that, in 2001, held at least 
24,147 prisoners known to be HIV-positive. LAURA MARUSCHAK, U.S. DEP’T 
OF JUSTICE, HIV IN PRISONS, 2001 2 (2004) [hereinafter HIV IN PRISONS 2001], 
available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/hivp01.pdf. 
10 511 U.S. 825 (1994). 
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prisons.11 Further, the Court held that inmates who are raped in 
prison due to the “deliberate indifference” of prison officials suffer 
cruel and unusual punishment within the meaning of the Eighth 
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.12 This decision was handed 
down fourteen years after Justice Blackmun noted in his dissent in 
United States v. Bailey that rape was a fact of prison life.13 
Johnson’s case suggests that this continues to be true in 2005.14 
Once a prisoner has been raped, or “turned out” in prison 
parlance,15 that prisoner (or “punk”)16 can expect to be 
continuously raped by other sexual predators and shared among 
prison gang members throughout his sentence.17 Alternatively, the 
prisoner’s body may become the property of a single dominating 
prisoner.18 This occurs despite the Supreme Court’s statement that 
sexual assault is “simply not part of the penalty that criminal 
                                                          
11 Farmer, 511 U.S. at 833 (holding that “allowing the beating or rape of 
one prisoner by another serves no ‘legitimate penological objective’”). 
12 Id. at 832-33. 
13 United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394, 421 (1980) (Blackmun, J., 
dissenting) “A youthful inmate can expect to be subjected to homosexual gang 
rape his first night in jail or, it has been said, even in the van on the way to jail. 
Weaker inmates become the property of stronger prisoners or gangs, who sell 
the sexual services of the victim.” Id. (footnote omitted). 
14 Johnson v. Johnson, 385 F.3d 503 (5th Cir. 2004). 
15 NO ESCAPE, supra note 9, at 90-91. 
16 Id. at 93. 
17 Ruiz v. Johnson, 37 F. Supp. 2d 855, 929 (S.D. Tex. 1999). 
The evidence before this court revealed a prison underworld in which 
rapes, beatings, and servitude are the currency of power. Inmates who 
refuse to join race-based gangs may be physically or sexually assaulted. 
To preserve their physical safety, some vulnerable inmates simply 
subject to being bought and sold among groups of prison predators, 
providing their oppressors with commissary goods, domestic services, 
or sexual favors. 
Id. 
18 Johnson v. Johnson, 385 F.3d 503 (5th Cir. 2004). In presenting the facts 
of the case, the Court of Appeals described Roderick Johnson’s experience, 
writing that “[i]n October 2000, not long after his arrival in the general 
population, a prison gang member named Hernandez asserted ‘ownership’ over 
Johnson, forcing Johnson to become his sexual servant.” Id. at 512. 
RIES MACROED CORRECTED 053105.DOC 6/6/2005 1:43 PM 
918 JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY 
offenders pay for their offenses against society.”19 
The 108th Congress endeavored to rid U.S. prisons of sexual 
assault by passing the Prison Rape Elimination Act of 2003 
(PREA).20 Congress incorporated into the statute a cause of action 
under Farmer for inmates who have been subjected to rape.21 
Additionally, Congress authorized funding for the Bureau of 
Justice Statistics to study this issue and created the National Prison 
Rape Elimination Commission to recommend national standards 
for eradicating prison rape.22 The PREA, by mandating the 
collection of records and the creation of standards for prison 
management, may aid future plaintiffs who, like Johnson, bring 
legal claims against prison officials who fail in their duty to protect 
prisoners from sexual assault by other prisoners. 
Both Congress and the Supreme Court have now expressed the 
need for prison administrators to address inmate-on-inmate rape in 
                                                          
19 Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994) (quoting Rhodes v. 
Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981)). The Court held that “[prison] conditions 
that cannot be said to be cruel and unusual under contemporary standards are not 
unconstitutional. To the extent that such conditions are restrictive and even 
harsh, they are part of the penalty that criminal offenders pay for their offenses 
against society.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834. 
20 Prison Rape Elimination Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-79, 117 Stat. 972 
(2003) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 15601-15609). For discussion of the lobbying 
effort behind the passage of the Prison Rape Elimination Act, see James E. 
Robertson, Compassionate Conservatism and Prison Rape: The Prison Rape 
Elimination Act, 30 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 1, 3-8 (2004). 
21 42 U.S.C. § 15601(13) (2005). Presuming that Congress knew the case 
law on prison rape, the PREA was passed in part to further inform the meaning 
of liability for deliberate indifference to rape. 
The high incidence of sexual assault within prisons involves actual and 
potential violations of the United States Constitution. In Farmer v. 
Brennan, the Supreme Court ruled that deliberate indifference to the 
substantial risk of sexual assault violates prisoners’ rights under the 
Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause of the Eighth Amendment. 
Id. (citation omitted). “Fighting prison rape is also affirmatively mandated by 
the Constitution.” 149 CONG. REC. H7765 (daily ed. July 25, 2003) (statement of 
Rep. Robert C. Scott). 
22 42 U.S.C. §§ 1560304, 15606 (2005). See infra Parts III.A., III.B for 
discussion of the Prison Rape Elimination Act. 
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correctional facilities.23 However, Congress’s effort to eliminate 
prison rape may be undermined by the discretion the statute affords 
to federal and state executive bodies in implementing preventive 
programs.24 Officials responsible for state prison systems may 
continue to deny the extent of prison rape within their facilities, 
while facility administrators may continue to tolerate its 
existence.25 Therefore, to have their constitutional rights 
                                                          
23 MATHEW BENDER & CO. CIVIL RIGHTS ACTIONS TREATISE § 2.09(C) 
(2004). “Prison officials have a clearly established duty not to be deliberately 
indifferent to physical or sexual assaults or the possibility of such assaults on 
inmates by other inmates.” Id. (citing Farmer v. Brennan, 525 U.S. 825 (1994)); 
42 U.S.C. § 15601(13) (2005) (incorporating the Supreme Court’s holding into 
the PREA by stating that “[i]n Farmer v. Brennan, the Supreme Court ruled that 
deliberate indifference to the substantial risk of sexual assault violates prisoners’ 
rights under the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause of the Eighth 
Amendment”) (citation omitted). 
24 See Olga Giller, Note and Comment, Patriarchy on Lockdown: 
Deliberate Indifference and Male Prison Rape, 10 CARDOZO WOMEN’S L.J. 659, 
688-89 (2004) (writing of the PREA that “eradicating prison rape takes more 
than passing legislation and setting legal precedent. . . . While physical changes 
in prison administration will assist in ameliorating the scourge of prison rape, 
only structural change will prove lasting”). See also Carla I. Barrett, Note, Does 
the Prison Rape Elimination Act Adequately Address the Problems Posed by 
Prison Overcrowding? If Not, What Will?, 39 N. ENG. L. REV. 391 (2005). 
Opponents to the PREA feel that the Act is simply an empty gesture 
that does show high-level governmental recognition of the problem of 
prison rape, but does not provide for any real remedy. Robert Weisberg 
and David Mills, writing for MSN Slate, claim that “the main thing the 
law aims to do is collect data,” a goal that will prove difficult because 
of “unreliable observations and underreporting inherent in prison 
assault” and redundant because many reports produced by various 
organizations across the country provide the same information that the 
government seeks to obtain. 
Id. at 427 (citing Robert Weisberg & David Mills, Violence Silence: Why No 
One Really Cares About Prison Rape, MSN SLATE, Oct. 1, 2003, at 
http://slate.msn.com/id/2089095). 
25 Within state systems, prison officials deny that the problem of prison 
rape is as substantial as prisoners, or even prison staff, report. NO ESCAPE, supra 
note 9, at 133-35. Whereas staff at three Nebraska state prisons estimated that 
sixteen percent of inmates “were being pressured or forced into sexual contact” 
in a 1996 study, id. at 135, over half of all state corrections departments officials 
surveyed by Human Rights Watch reported that sexual assault occurred too 
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vindicated, inmates will be forced to bring suits that rely on 
Farmer, but will prevail only when they can show that “deliberate 
indifference” by wardens or other prison officials contributed to 
the assaults they endured.26 Federal courts may grant 
administrators discretion in prisoners’ rights cases,27 but this 
discretion should not include the power to ignore the threat of 
sexual assault to prisoners under their control. 
This note explores the potential uses of the PREA in litigation 
brought by inmates against prison officials for “deliberate 
indifference” to the threat of rape. Part I describes the procedures 
used and the obstacles faced by prisoners who bring lawsuits 
challenging the conditions of their imprisonment. Part II discusses 
the Supreme Court’s “deliberate indifference” standard for holding 
prison supervisors liable for Eighth Amendment violations and 
examines the application of this standard by the federal courts to 
claims brought by prisoners in response to assaults within prisons. 
Part III presents a review of the PREA and outlines some of the 
prison programs that could be implemented as a result of the 
legislation. Lastly, Part IV of this note discusses ways in which 
future plaintiffs who sue prison officials for deliberate indifference 
to a risk of sexual assault will be able to use the PREA in their 
lawsuits. 
                                                          
infrequently to maintain data. Id. at 133. 
Penal security staffs will also, if not encourage, then definitely tolerate 
a homosexual relationship by a potentially troublesome prisoner, 
theorizing that a prisoner who is getting some degree of emotional and 
sexual gratification from his prison “wife” is less likely to cause trouble 
than a prisoner who is not because he’s comfortable and, once 
emotionally attached, he will not want to lose his “wife”. 
WALTER RIDEAU & RON WILKBERG, LIFE SENTENCES: RAGE AND SURVIVAL 
BEHIND BARS 88-89 (1992). 
26 Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994). 
27 Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 548 (1979) (“[T]he operation of our 
correctional facilities is peculiarly the province of the Legislative and Executive 
Branches of our Government, not the Judicial.”). 
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I. PRISONER LITIGATION 
Under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 (Section 1983), inmates can sue 
prison staff for violations of their Eighth Amendment right to be 
free from cruel and unusual punishment.28 Lawsuits alleging harms 
against a prisoner perpetrated by another prisoner are brought as 
“condition-of-confinement” claims29 on the theory that when an 
individual is held in custody, there is a corresponding duty 
assumed by the government to ensure that the individual will 
remain safe.30 Only in the last quarter of the twentieth century have 
prisoner challenges to conditions of confinement been recognized 
by the Supreme Court as valid claims under the Eighth 
Amendment.31 This expansion of constitutional protection has 
                                                          
28 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2005). In relevant part, the statute states: 
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, 
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, 
subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or 
other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any 
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, 
shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or 
other proper proceeding for redress, except that in any action brought 
against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer’s 
judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a 
declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable. 
Id. See infra Part I.A. Federal officials are sued for violations of prisoners’ rights 
in actions known as “Bivens claims” pursuant to the Supreme Court’s decision 
in Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 
403 U.S. 388 (1971). For city officials who are responsible for the conditions of 
city jails, liability under Section 1983 is controlled by the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Monell v. Dep’t of Social Serv., 436 U.S. 658 (1978). 
29 See infra part I.B. Flint v. Ky. Dep’t of Corr., 270 F.3d 340, 352 (6th Cir. 
2001). “Where the harm is perpetrated by another prisoner, rather than by a 
government official, the claim is characterized as one of ‘conditions of 
confinement,’ rather than of ‘excessive use of government force.’” Id. (quoting 
Thaddeus-X v. Blatter, 175 F.3d 378, 400-01 (6th Cir. 1999)). 
30 DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep’t of Social Serv., 489 U.S. 189, 
199-200 (1989). “[W]hen the State takes a person into custody and holds him 
there against his will, the Constitution imposes upon it a corresponding duty to 
assume some responsibility for his safety and general well-being.” Id. 
31 Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 345-46 (1981) (describing expansion 
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since been limited by further decisions of the Supreme Court and 
by Congress’s passage of the Prison Litigation Reform Act.32 
A. Prisoner Claims under Section 1983 
Section 1983 provides a right of action for a person who 
suffers “a deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities 
secured by the Constitution” under color of law.33 State prisoners 
may bring claims under this statute34 for violations of their First 
Amendment rights to expression,35 association,36 and religion,37 as 
well as their due process rights,38 privacy rights under the Fourth 
Amendment,39 and Eighth Amendment rights.40 Federal prisoners 
are able to bring similar claims against federal prison officials, 
known as “Bivens claims,” following the Supreme Court’s 
                                                          
of Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Eighth Amendment “beyond the 
barbarous physical punishments at issue in the Court’s earliest cases” to reach 
conditions “that are ‘totally without penological justification”) (quoting Gregg v. 
Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 183 (1976)). 
32 See infra Part I.C. 
33 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2005). 
34 Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961) (discussing reasons for applying 
Section 1983 to the states and stating of the Act that one “aim was to provide a 
federal remedy where the state remedy, though adequate in theory, was not 
available in practice”). 
35 Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396 (1974) (hearing a claim brought by 
California state inmates under § 1983 to challenge censorship of prisoner mail). 
36 Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987) (hearing a claim brought by 
Missouri state inmates to challenge prison restrictions on inmate-to-inmate 
communications as well as inmate marriages). 
37 O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 347 (1987) (hearing a claim 
brought by New Jersey state inmates under § 1983 challenging prison regulation 
that prevented them from attending a Muslim congregational service). 
38 Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 476 (1995) (hearing a claim brought by 
a Hawaii state inmate under § 1983 for a deprivation of procedural due process 
in connection with a prison disciplinary hearing). 
39 Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 520 (1984) (hearing a claim brought by 
a Virginia state inmate under § 1983 challenging a search of his cell for 
contraband as unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment). 
40 Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1 (1992) (hearing a claim brought by a 
Louisiana state inmate under § 1983 for guards’ use of excessive force). 
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decision in Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal 
Bureau of Narcotics.41 The Supreme Court has held that 
supervisors of state employees may be held liable for their 
subordinates’ conduct under Section 1983 only when there is an 
“affirmative link” between a violation of a plaintiff’s constitutional 
rights and the supervisor’s own official conduct.42 In the context of 
an inmate’s lawsuit, the Court held that Section 1983 “contains no 
state-of-mind requirement independent of that necessary to state a 
violation of the underlying constitutional right.”43 Thus, 
supervisors can only be held liable for their own culpable conduct, 
not for that of their subordinates through respondeat superior.44 
Supervisors may be liable for “failure to supervise”45 as well as 
“failure to train” employees under their control.46 A supervisor’s 
                                                          
41 Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 
403 U.S. 388 (1971) (holding that federal courts have jurisdiction over claims of 
constitutional rights violations under 28 U.S.C. § 1331); see also Michael Irvine, 
Excerpts from a Jailhouse Lawyer’s Manual, Fifth Edition: Chapter 17: Using 
42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 42 U.S.C. § 1331 to Obtain Relief from Violations of 
Federal Law, 31 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 305, 349 (2000) [hereinafter 
Jailhouse Lawyer’s Manual § 1983]. 
42 Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 371 (1976) (holding that supervisors of 
the Philadelphia police department were not liable for unconstitutional 
mistreatment by police officers because “there was no affirmative link between 
the occurrence of the various incidents of police misconduct and the adoption of 
any plan or policy by [the defendants]—express or otherwise—showing their 
authorization or approval of such misconduct”). See Kit Kinports, The Buck 
Does Not Stop Here: Supervisory Liability in Section 1983 Cases, 1997 U. ILL. 
L. REV. 147, 151-52 (1997) [hereinafter Kinports]. 
43 Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 329-30 (1986) (affirming summary 
judgment for defendant where inmate claimed a negligent deprivation of liberty 
without due process under the Fourteenth Amendment because he suffered 
injuries caused by defendant’s misplacement of a pillowcase in a jailhouse 
stairway). 
44 Kinports, supra note 42, at 153 (describing that Monell v. Dep’t of 
Social Serv., 436 U.S. 658 (1978), “signaled the Court’s unwillingness to 
impose respondeat superior liability on supervisors”). 
45 Monell, 436 U.S. at 694 n.58 (“By our decision in Rizzo v. Goode, 423 
U.S. 362 (1976), we would appear to have decided that the mere right to control 
without any control or direction having been exercised and without any failure 
to supervise is not enough to support § 1983 liability.”). 
46 City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388 (1989) (holding that 
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direct participation in a constitutional rights violation also will 
make that supervisor liable under Section 1983, as will the creation 
of policies or customs that lead to a foreseeable violation.47 Noting 
that the Supreme Court has not established a standard for 
supervisory liability under Section 1983 separate from the 
constitutional standard applied to violations of the specific right 
alleged, Professor Kit Kinports has identified various factors that 
courts of appeals use in assessing supervisors’ culpability: 
[T]he courts of appeals tend to agree that five interrelated 
factors ought to be considered in applying that 
[constitutional] standard and determining whether a 
particular supervisor is liable on the facts of a given case: 
(1) the extent to which prior similar incidents have 
occurred; (2) the supervisor’s response to those prior 
incidents; (3) the supervisor’s response to the specific 
incident on which the suit is based; (4) the extent to which 
the supervisor can be considered a cause of the violation; 
and (5) the nature of the supervisor’s awareness of the 
constitutional misconduct.48 
Since state governments are immune from legal claims by way 
of the Eleventh Amendment,49 courts must find individual officials 
                                                          
“inadequacy of [government employee] training may serve as the basis for § 
1983 liability only where the failure to train amounts to deliberate indifference 
to the rights of persons with whom the [employees] come into contact”). For 
cases applying “failure to train” liability to supervisors, see Kinports, supra note 
42, at 165-68. 
47 Jailhouse Lawyer’s Manual § 1983, supra note 41, at 308. 
48 Kinports, supra note 42, at 169. 
Although the courts agree that these are the relevant considerations, 
they have not been consistent in applying them. As a result, the courts 
have reached contrary outcomes in similar cases, seemingly without 
any regard to the particular standard of supervisory liability they 
purport to be applying. And all too often, they have been unduly 
generous in ruling in favor of supervisory officials. 
Id. 
49 Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 276 (1986). 
The [Eleventh] Amendment provides: “The Judicial power of the 
United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or 
equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by 
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liable for their injuries to provide prisoners with redress. Individual 
officials whose conduct is within the scope of Section 1983 may 
nevertheless be immune from liability. The Supreme Court held in 
Imbler v. Pachtman, for example, that legislators, judges, and 
prosecutors receive absolute immunity when sued under Section 
1983, unless they commit “willful deprivations of Constitutional 
rights.”50 Other government officials avoid liability under Section 
1983 when they act in their “official capacities.”51 However, 
pursuant to the Supreme Court’s decision in Monell v. Department 
of Social Services, officials can be sued under Section 1983 for 
their execution of a government policy or custom when that policy 
or custom is the “moving force of the constitutional violation” 
alleged.52 This has provided the means for holding government 
supervisors liable when those supervisors represent government 
policy.53 
Government officials may be found liable for damages when 
their conduct is beyond the scope of their official capacities; thus, 
they are said to have “qualified immunity.”54 The doctrine of 
                                                          
Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign 
State.” This language expressly encompasses only suits brought against 
a State by citizens of another State, but this Court long ago held that the 
Amendment bars suits against a State by citizens of that same State as 
well. 
Id. (citing Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890)). 
50 Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 429 (1976). 
51 Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989) (holding that 
“neither a State nor its officials acting in their official capacities are ‘persons’ 
under § 1983”). 
52 Monell v. Dep’t of Social Serv., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978).  
[I]t is when execution of a government’s policy or custom, whether 
made by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be 
said to represent official policy, inflicts the injury that the government 
as an entity is responsible under § 1983. . . . [T]his case unquestionably 
involves official policy as the moving force of the constitutional 
violation. 
Id. 
53 Id. at 694. 
54 Id. at 707 (Powell, J., concurring). “It has been clear that a public official 
may be held liable in damages when his actions are found to violate a 
constitutional right and there is no qualified immunity.” Id. (citing Wood v. 
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qualified immunity deems government officials liable only when 
“it would be clear to a reasonable official that his conduct was 
unlawful in the situation he confronted.”55 This applies to all 1983 
claims and severely limits the ability of plaintiffs to win damages 
under Section 1983.56 To defeat a government official’s motion for 
qualified immunity, a plaintiff must first demonstrate that a 
violation of federal or constitutional law indeed occurred and then 
proceed to show that the violated law was clearly established and 
that a reasonable official would have understood his conduct to be 
a violation.57 When defendants prevail on grounds of qualified 
                                                          
Strickland, 420 U.S. 308 (1975); Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U.S. 555 (1978)). 
55 Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 202 (2001). 
56 Sheldon Nahomad, From the Courtroom to the Street: Court Orders and 
Section 1983, 29 HASTINGS CONST. L. Q. 613, 637-38 (2002). 
The damages remedy functions not only to deter unconstitutional 
conduct but also to compensate innocent people as a matter of 
corrective justice. Regrettably, however, the Supreme Court has all too 
often emphasized the possible over-deterrence of government officials 
and employees at the expense of providing corrective justice to those 
harmed by unconstitutional conduct. It is fair to say that this move has 
been based on the Court’s intuition about the non-meritorious nature of 
many 1983 claims, to say nothing of its concern for federalism, and its 
apparent distaste for many 1983 plaintiffs, especially prisoners. It was 
on such grounds, for example, that the Court transformed qualified 
immunity, originally a defense to liability, into an immunity from suit, 
effectively converting it, primarily for instrumental reasons, into a kind 
of absolute immunity. 
Id. (footnotes omitted). 
57 Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201-02. 
A court required to rule upon the qualified immunity issue must 
consider, then, this threshold question: Taken in the light most 
favorable to the party asserting the injury, do the facts alleged show the 
officer’s conduct violated a constitutional right? . . . [T]he next, 
sequential step is to ask whether the right was clearly established. . . . 
The relevant, dispositive inquiry in determining whether a right is 
clearly established is whether it would be clear to a reasonable officer 
that his conduct was unlawful in the situation he confronted. 
Id. Relying on Supreme Court decisions is the most persuasive means for a 
plaintiff to claim that the right allegedly violated was clearly-established at the 
time of their injury. Daugherty v. Campbell, 935 F.2d 780, 784 (6th Cir. 1991) 
(holding that the Sixth Circuit looks “first to decisions of the Supreme Court” in 
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immunity, plaintiffs’ constitutional harms may be left 
uncompensated, and only plaintiffs who seek injunctive relief or 
take solace in further establishing the law for future litigants will 
be satisfied.58 
For plaintiffs using Section 1983 to remedy a constitutional 
harm, injunctive relief is generally available as are both 
compensatory and punitive damages.59 Only when state and 
municipal officials are sued in their “individual capacities,” 
however, can they be held liable for monetary damages.60 Plaintiffs 
suing officials in their “official capacities” can expect to receive at 
most injunctive relief.61 For prisoners, both the injunctive relief 
and monetary relief available under Section 1983 and through 
Bivens claims have been severely limited by the Prison Litigation 
                                                          
determining whether rights are clearly established for purposes of qualified 
immunity). Courts of Appeals decisions clearly establish the law in their own 
circuits. The Supreme Court’s decision in Hope v. Pelzer, held that a 
Department of Justice report warning prison officials that their conduct might 
violate the Eighth Amendment provided notice sufficient to deny them qualified 
immunity. 536 U.S. 730 (2002). This raises the question of what role 
administrative regulations might generally play in clearly establishing law for 
qualified immunity purposes. See Amanda K. Eaton, Optical Illusions: The 
Hazy Contours of the Clearly Established Law and the Effects of Hope v. Pelzer 
on the Qualified Immunity Doctrine, 38 GA. L. REV. 661, 709-10 (2004). 
58 John C. Jeffries, The Right-Remedy Gap in Constitutional Law, 109 
YALE L.J. 87, 113 (1999). 
Qualified immunity disfavors the backward-looking remedy of cash 
payments to victims of past harms and, in so doing, opens the door to 
forward-looking remedies requiring investments in the future. 
Structural reform injunctions walk through that door. They direct 
resources toward preventing future harms rather than compensating 
past injuries, thereby implementing the bias in favor of the future that 
qualified immunity invites and allows. 
Id. 
59 See Daniel D. Williams, Twenty-Eighth Annual Review of Criminal 
Procedure: VI. Prisoners’ Rights: Procedural Means of Enforcement Under 42 
U.S.C. § 1983, 87 GEO. L.J. 1940, 1944-45 (1999). A prevailing plaintiff may 
also recover attorney’s fees. 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (2005). 
60 Jailhouse Lawyer’s Manual § 1983, supra note 41, at 309. 
61 Id. 
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Reform Act.62 The Supreme Court also has reined in the discretion 
of federal courts to fashion injunctions to prevent violations of 
prisoners’ constitutional rights.63 Therefore, even successful 
prisoner-plaintiffs face difficulties in obtaining meaningful relief. 
B. Challenges to Conditions of Confinement 
Until late in the twentieth century, the Eighth Amendment’s 
prohibition against “cruel and unusual punishments” was applied 
only to criminal sentences.64 However, through its decisions in 
Estelle v. Gamble and Rhodes v. Chapman, the Supreme Court 
                                                          
62 See infra Part I.C. 
63 Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343 (1996) (reversing a decision of the Ninth 
Circuit that upheld an injunction ordering improvements to a prison system’s 
law libraries). 
The actual-injury requirement would hardly serve the purpose we have 
described above— of preventing courts from undertaking tasks 
assigned to the political branches —if once a plaintiff demonstrated 
harm from one particular inadequacy in government administration, the 
court were authorized to remedy all inadequacies in that administration. 
The remedy must of course be limited to the inadequacy that produced 
the injury in fact that the plaintiff has established. 
Id. at 357 (emphasis in original); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 544 (1979) 
(holding that judges ought to be discouraged from managing prisons). 
The court might disagree with the choice of means to effectuate 
[security] interests, but it should not “second-guess the expert 
administrators on matters on which they are better informed. . . . 
Concern with minutiae of prison administration can only distract the 
court from detached consideration of the one overriding question 
presented to it: does the practice or condition violate the Constitution?” 
Id. at 544 (quoting Wolfish v. Levi, 573 F.2d 118 (2d Cir. 1978)). 
64 Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 18 (1992) (Thomas, J., dissenting) 
Until recent years, the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause was not 
deemed to apply at all to deprivations that were not inflicted as part of 
the sentence for a crime. For generations, judges and commentators 
regarded the Eighth Amendment as applying only to torturous 
punishments meted out by statutes or sentencing judges, and not 
generally to any hardship that might befall a prisoner during 
incarceration. 
Id. 
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interpreted the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause of the 
Eighth Amendment to include prison conditions.65 These decisions 
came during a period in which the federal courts had employed a 
“totality-of-circumstances” analysis to issue structural injunctions 
intended to prevent prison conditions from becoming overly 
harsh.66 
In Estelle v. Gamble, a case brought as a challenge to the level 
of medical care offered in a Texas state prison, a prisoner claimed 
that he had received inadequate treatment for an injury he 
sustained while performing a prison work assignment.67 The 
Supreme Court used its established Eighth Amendment doctrine of 
measuring punishments against “evolving standards of decency” to 
hold that the constitutionality of conditions of imprisonment could 
                                                          
65 Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976); Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 
337 (1981). Arguments against this extension of the Eighth Amendment persist 
in Supreme Court dissents by Justice Thomas and in commentary. See, e.g., Sara 
Rose, Comment, “Cruel and Unusual Punishment” Need Not Be Cruel, 
Unusual, or Punishment, 24 CAP. U.L. REV. 827 (1995). 
66 Russel W. Gray, Note, Wilson v. Seiter: Defining the Components of and 
Proposing a Direction for Eighth Amendment Prison Condition Law, 41 AM. 
U.L. REV. 1339, 1352 (1992) (citing Courts of Appeals decisions from 1970 
through 1985 that applied the totality of circumstances test); John Jeffries, supra 
note 58, at 111-12. Professor Jeffries argues that remedies exceeded rights when 
courts ordered more structural injunctions, because 
courts increasingly focused on prophylactic precautions against the risk 
of constitutional violations. Over time, specific remedial strategies that 
recurred in one case after another assumed a life of their own. They 
underwent a subtle transformation from ad hoc remedies for 
independently demonstrated unconstitutionality of confinement to 
normative criteria for assessing the acceptability of prison operation. In 
effect, remedies became quasi-rights. . . . Whether this phenomenon is 
described as remedy exceeding right or as remedy implicitly redefining 
right or as remedy merely becoming a “criter[ion] by which . . . 
lawfulness is judged” is for present purposes immaterial. The important 
point is that in structural reform litigation, courts prospectively and 
selectively impose requirements that in other remedial contexts would 
not be constitutionally compelled. 
Id. at 111-12 (quoting in part Note, Complex Enforcement: Unconstitutional 
Prison Conditions, 94 HARV. L. REV. 626, 638 (1981)). 
67 Estelle, 429 U.S. at 98. 
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be assessed under the Eighth Amendment.68 The Court held, 
however, that whereas the “evolving standards of decency” 
assessment provided an objective test for determining whether a 
punishment was cruel and unusual, claims regarding conditions of 
confinement required an inquiry into the subjective intent of the 
prison’s officers.69 The Court adopted a “deliberate indifference” 
standard for evaluating the actions of prison officials.70 The Court 
required a finding of “wanton infliction of pain” in order to hold 
prison officials liable for unconstitutional prison conditions.71 This 
standard was intended to limit the liability of prison officials to the 
creation or support of conditions that could genuinely be deemed 
“cruel” under the Eighth Amendment.72 Although the Court 
deemed the medical care offered to the prisoner a condition of his 
confinement, it denied that any inadequacies in the prisoner’s care 
constituted cruel and unusual punishment.73 The Court maintained 
that, in general, defendant prison officials should be found at fault 
under this standard only when the conditions are “wanton,” as only 
                                                          
68 Id. at 102. “[W]e have held repugnant to the Eighth Amendment 
punishments which are incompatible with ‘the evolving standards of decency 
that mark the progress of a maturing society.’” Id. (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 
U.S. 86, 101 (1958)). 
69 Id. at 105-06. 
[A]n inadvertent failure to provide adequate medical care cannot be 
said to constitute “an unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain” or to 
be “repugnant to the conscience of mankind”. . . . In order to state a 
cognizable claim, a prisoner must allege acts or omissions sufficiently 
harmful to evidence deliberate indifference to serious medical needs. It 
is only such indifference that can offend “evolving standards of 
decency” in violation of the Eighth Amendment. 
Id.; Gray, supra note 66, at 1357-58 (explaining that the Supreme Court’s state-
of-mind requirement for conditions of confinement derives from the Eighth 
Amendment’s explicit proscription only of punishment). 
70 Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104 (“We therefore conclude that deliberate 
indifference to serious medical needs of prisoners constitutes the ‘unnecessary 
and wanton infliction of pain’ proscribed by the Eighth Amendment.”) (citation 
omitted). 
71 Id. at 104. 
72 Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 297-98 (1991) (discussing the holding of 
Estelle v. Gamble). 
73 Estelle, 429 U.S. at 107-08. 
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then can the prison conditions at issue be considered 
“punishment.”74 
Having accepted that conditions of confinement could impose 
constitutional harms on prisoners, the Supreme Court soon was 
faced with the task of determining more precisely which conditions 
merited judicial scrutiny. In Hutto v. Finney,75 a majority of the 
Court held that the “interdependence of the conditions producing 
the violation”76 justified “a comprehensive order to insure against 
the risk of inadequate compliance.”77 Shortly thereafter, the Court 
examined a challenge under the Eighth Amendment to 
overcrowded prison conditions.78 In Rhodes v. Chapman, the Court 
considered “whether the housing of two inmates in a single cell . . . 
is cruel and unusual punishment”79 as a condition of confinement 
or as the root cause of other harms suffered by inmates.80 The 
majority decision held that the so-called “double-celling” of 
inmates was not unconstitutional per se;81 rather, “restrictive and 
                                                          
74 Seiter, 501 U.S. at 300. For a discussion of the subjective element of the 
Eighth Amendment’s application to conditions of confinement, as defined in 
Farmer v. Brennan, see infra Part II.A. 
75 Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 684 (1978) (affirming an injunction 
against the Arkansas prison system “that placed limits on the number of men 
that could be confined in one cell, required that each have a bunk, discontinued 
the ‘grue’ diet, and set 30 days as the maximum isolation sentence”). 
76 Id. at 688. 
77 Id. at 687. 
78 Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337 (1981). 
79 Id. at 339. 
80 Id. at 340. 
Asserting a cause of action under 42 U. S. C. § 1983, [plaintiffs] 
contended that “double celling” at [their facility] violated the 
Constitution. The gravamen of their complaint was that double celling 
confined cellmates too closely. It also was blamed for overcrowding at 
[the prison], said to have overwhelmed the prison’s facilities and staff. 
As relief, respondents sought an injunction barring petitioners, who are 
Ohio officials responsible for the administration of SOCF, from 
housing more than one inmate in a cell, except as a temporary measure. 
Id. 
81 Id. at 350. “The question before us is . . . whether the actual conditions 
of confinement . . . are cruel and unusual.” Id. (emphasis added). 
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even harsh” conditions were a constitutional “part of the penalty 
that criminal offenders pay for their offenses against society.”82 
The Court emphasized, however, that conditions of confinement 
may not be “grossly disproportionate to the severity of the crime 
warranting imprisonment.”83 
Further, the Rhodes decision refocused the inquiry conducted 
by the court in Estelle and Hutto by examining whether the 
allegedly unconstitutional condition caused “unquestioned and 
serious deprivations of basic human needs” comprising “the 
minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities.”84 The Court’s 
subsequent decision in Wilson v. Seiter85 accepted this inquiry as 
the objective test for evaluating prison conditions under the Eighth 
Amendment, holding that, whether alone or in isolation, conditions 
of confinement are cruel and unusual when they deprive prisoners 
of “a single, identifiable human need.”86 In subsequent condition 
of confinement cases, the Supreme Court recognized that “human 
needs” include food, clothing, shelter, medical care, and reasonable 
                                                          
82 Id. at 347. “[C]onditions that cannot be said to be cruel and unusual 
under contemporary standards are not unconstitutional. To the extent that such 
conditions are restrictive and even harsh, they are part of the penalty that 
criminal offenders pay for their offenses against society.” Id. 
83 Id. “Conditions must not involve the wanton and unnecessary infliction 
of pain, nor may they be grossly disproportionate to the severity of the crime 
warranting imprisonment.” Id. 
84 Id.  
In Estelle v. Gamble, we held that the denial of medical care is cruel 
and unusual because, in the worst case, it can result in physical torture, 
and, even in less serious cases, it can result in pain without any 
penological purpose. In Hutto v. Finney, the conditions of confinement 
in two Arkansas prisons constituted cruel and unusual punishment 
because they resulted in unquestioned and serious deprivations of basic 
human needs. Conditions other than those in Gamble and Hutto, alone 
or in combination, may deprive inmates of the minimal civilized 
measure of life’s necessities. 
Id. 
85 501 U.S. 294 (1991). 
86 Id. at 304. See also Gray, supra note 66, at 1384-85 (discussing Wilson v. 
Seiter’s rejection of the “totality of circumstances” test in favor of the “core 
conditions” or “single identifiable human need” test). 
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safety.87 The Supreme Court’s condition of confinement decisions 
also clarified that state officials may be held responsible for the 
constitutional harms to which inmates are exposed during 
imprisonment.88 
In Helling v. McKinney, the Court extended the protection of 
the Eighth Amendment to prospective violations, noting that it 
would be “odd” for courts to ignore the threat of future 
constitutional harms.89 In that case, a prisoner challenged the 
conditions of his confinement based on the imminent danger posed 
by the secondhand smoke to which he was exposed by his 
cellmate.90 Recognizing the potential validity of the prisoner’s 
claim, the Court remanded the case to the trial court for a 
determination regarding whether the conditions complained of 
were sufficiently serious to satisfy both the objective and 
                                                          
87 DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep’t of Social Serv., 489 U.S. 189, 
199-200 (1989), and citing cases, infra note 88. 
88 Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 33 (1994). “It is cruel and unusual 
punishment to hold convicted criminals in unsafe conditions.” Id. (citing 
Deshaney, 489 U.S. at 200; Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 315-316 
(1982)); Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 311 (1991) (White, J., concurring) 
(“[H]aving chosen to use imprisonment as a form of punishment, a State must 
ensure that the conditions in its prisons comport with the ‘contemporary 
standard of decency’ required by the Eighth Amendment.”) (citing DeShaney, 
489 U.S. at 198-200); id. at 199-200 (1989). 
[W]hen the State by the affirmative exercise of its power so restrains an 
individual’s liberty that it renders him unable to care for himself, and at 
the same time fails to provide for his basic human needs—e. g., food, 
clothing, shelter, medical care, and reasonable safety—it transgresses 
the substantive limits on state action set by the Eighth Amendment and 
the Due Process Clause. 
Id.; see also Will A. Smith, Comment, Civil Liability for Sexual Assault in 
Prison: A Challenge to the “Deliberate Indifference” Standard, 34 CUMB. L. 
REV. 289, 309-11 (2003) (describing applications of this dicta from DeShaney as 
a “state-created-danger theory” of liability). 
89 509 U.S. 25 (1994). 
90 Id. at 28. “The complaint . . . alleged that respondent was assigned to a 
cell with another inmate who smoked five packs of cigarettes a day. . . . 
Respondent sought injunctive relief and damages for [prison officials] 
subjecting him to cruel and unusual punishment by jeopardizing his health.” Id. 
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subjective tests of deliberate indifference.91 The Court held that a 
challenge to a future harm requires a likelihood and seriousness 
beyond what “a scientific and statistical inquiry” can provide.92 A 
prisoner must show both that the future harm threatens to deprive 
him of an identifiable human need and “that the risk of which he 
complains is not one that today’s society chooses to tolerate.”93 In 
Farmer v. Brennan, the Court resolved that protection against 
sexual assault is a human need warranting protection under the 
Eighth Amendment.94 
C. The Prison Litigation Reform Act: An Obstacle to Prisoner 
Rape Suits 
In 1996, the course of prison litigation was altered still further 
through Congress’s enactment of the Prison Litigation Reform Act 
(PLRA).95 The PLRA was passed to address a perceived deluge of 
                                                          
91 Id. at 35. 
92 Id. at 36. “[W]ith respect to the objective factor, determining whether 
McKinney’s conditions of confinement violate the Eighth Amendment requires 
more than a scientific and statistical inquiry into the seriousness of the potential 
harm and the likelihood that such injury to health will actually be caused by 
exposure to [secondhand smoke].” Id. 
93 Id. For a more complete discussion of the Court’s treatment of imminent 
dangers in Helling v. McKinney, see Katherine L. Frazier, Comment, 
Constitutional Law – Helling v. McKinney: Future Risks of Harm Actionable 
Under the Eighth Amendment, 25 U. MEM. L. REV. 1479 (1995). 
94 Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832-33 (1994). 
[T]he treatment a prisoner receives in prison and the conditions under 
which he is confined are subject to scrutiny under the Eighth 
Amendment. . . . [P]rison officials must ensure that inmates receive 
adequate food, clothing, shelter, and medical care, and must take 
reasonable measures to guarantee the safety of the inmates. In 
particular . . . prison officials have a duty to protect prisoners from 
violence at the hands of other prisoners. . . . [G]ratuitously allowing the 
beating or rape of one prisoner by another serves no legitimate 
penological objective [nor] squares with evolving standards of decency. 
Id. (quotations and citations omitted). 
95 Prison Litigation Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 
(1996) (codified as amended in 18 U.S.C. § 3636, 28 U.S.C. § 1915, 28 U.S.C. § 
1346, 42 U.S.C. § 1997, and other scattered sections). 
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frivolous and meritless prisoner claims that overwhelmed the 
federal courts.96 The legislation significantly limits the types of 
claims and remedies that are available to inmates.97 Indeed, in 
1997, the number of prisoner civil rights suits filed decreased by 
thirty-one percent;98 by 2000, that number decreased further to 
forty percent less than before passage of the PLRA.99 
Prior to the enactment of the PLRA, the Attorney General was 
responsible for certifying that each state prison system’s grievance 
procedure was in compliance with standards issued pursuant to the 
Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act.100 A court would 
scrutinize a prison’s administrative grievance procedure before 
                                                          
96 Jennifer Winslow, Comment, The Prison Litigation Reform Act’s 
Physical Injury Requirement Bars Meritorious Lawsuits: Was It Meant To?, 49 
UCLA L. REV. 1655, 1658 (2002). 
PLRA proponents declared their intention to curtail the number of 
frivolous and meritless inmate suits clogging the federal judiciary. 
They then used exaggerated examples of inmate complaints to suggest 
subtly that all inmate suits are frivolous and meritless. While 
proponents provided assurances that meritorious inmate suits would not 
be affected by the PLRA, they made little effort to acknowledge that 
meritorious inmate suits do exist. 
Id. 
97 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c) (2005). “The court shall . . . dismiss any action 
brought with respect to prison conditions . . . if the court is satisfied that the 
action is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief can be 
granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such 
relief.” Id. 
98 Randall S. Jeffrey, Restricting Prisoners’ Equal Access to the Federal 
Courts: The Three Strikes Provision of the Prison Litigation Reform Act and 
Substantive Equal Protection, 49 BUFFALO L. REV. 1099, 1108 n.29 (2001) 
(citing Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 597 n.18 (1998) (citing ADMIN. 
OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE UNITED STATES 
COURTS, STATISTICAL TABLES FOR THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY 28 tbl. C-2 (2000)). 
99 Brian J. Ostrom et al., Congress, Courts and Corrections: An Empirical 
Perspective on the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1525, 
1525 (2003). 
100 Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act, Pub L. No. 96-247, 94 
Stat. 349 (1980) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1997-1997j (1994)). For discussion of 
how this certification program was administered ineffectively by the Justice 
Department, see Note, Resolving Prisoners’ Grievances Out of Court: 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1997e, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1309, 1320 (1991). 
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deciding whether to dismiss the inmate’s claim for failure to 
exhaust his administrative remedies.101 The PLRA, however, 
limited judicial scrutiny of grievance procedures to the simple 
question of whether a prison made any remedies available through 
a grievance procedure.102 Thus, under the PLRA, federal courts 
will dismiss a Section 1983 suit brought by a prisoner if 
administrative remedies are available and the prisoner has failed to 
exhaust them.103 The PLRA also raised the stakes for dismissals of 
claims by enacting a “three strikes” provision for prisoners’ court 
fee waivers.104 Prisoners whose lawsuits were “dismissed on the 
grounds that [they were] frivolous, malicious, or fail[ed] to state a 
claim” on three prior occasions would become ineligible for fee 
waivers in all future actions or appeals.105 
Under the PLRA, in order to prevail on a claim for 
compensatory damages, a prisoner must demonstrate a physical 
                                                          
101 42 U.S.C. § 1997 (1994). See Lynn S. Branham, The Prison Litigation 
Reform Act’s Enigmatic Exhaustion Requirement: What It Means and What 
Congress, Courts and Correctional Officials Can Learn From It, 86 CORNELL L. 
REV. 483 (2001). 
102 Branham, supra note 101, at 498. “The only substantive requirement 
remaining on the face of [42 U.S.C. § 1997(e)] that administrative remedies 
must meet in order for the exhaustion requirement to apply is that the remedies 
be ‘available.’” Id. 
103 42 U.S.C. § 1997(e) was amended by the Prison Litigation Reform Act 
to make exhaustion of administrative remedies a requirement of litigation. “No 
action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under section 1983 of 
this title, or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or 
other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available are 
exhausted.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) (2005). 
104 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) (2005). 
In no event shall a prisoner bring a civil action or appeal a judgment in 
a civil action or proceeding [in forma pauperis] if the prisoner has, on 3 
or more prior occasions, while incarcerated or detained in any facility, 
brought an action or appeal in a court of the United States that was 
dismissed on the grounds that it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state 
a claim upon which relief may be granted, unless the prisoner is under 
imminent danger of serious physical injury. 
 Id. 
105 Id. Jeffrey, supra note 98, at 1133. 
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injury.106 Congress categorically denied recovery for mental and 
emotional injuries to prisoners without evidence of “actual injury,” 
a requirement that the federal courts already maintained.107 The 
PLRA also placed limitations on the injunctive relief available to 
inmates.108 The statute mandates that federal courts may order only 
narrowly-drawn injunctions that address the likelihood of a 
specific injury’s reoccurring.109 Despite these restrictions, 
prisoners continue to bring suits asking courts to enjoin prison 
supervisors and improve unsafe conditions.110 
                                                          
106 42 U.S.C. § 1997e (2005). “Limitation on recovery. No Federal civil 
action may be brought by a prisoner confined in a jail, prison, or other 
correctional facility, for mental or emotional injury suffered while in custody 
without a prior showing of physical injury.” Id. 
107 See Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 264 (1978) (“[A]lthough mental and 
emotional distress caused by the denial of procedural due process itself is 
compensable under § 1983, we hold that neither the likelihood of such injury nor 
the difficulty of proving it is so great as to justify awarding compensatory 
damages without proof that such injury actually was caused.”); Slicker v. 
Jackson, 215 F.3d 1225, 1229 (11th Cir. 2000) (holding that “compensatory 
damages under § 1983 may be awarded only based on actual injuries caused by 
the defendant and cannot be presumed or based on the abstract value of the 
constitutional rights that the defendant violated”) (citing Carey, 435 U.S. at 264; 
Memphis Community School District v. Stachura, 477 U.S. 299, 309 (1986)); 
But see Durrell v. Cook, 71 Fed. Appx. 718, 719 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that 
“mental injury suffices for Eighth Amendment cruel and unusual punishment 
cases”). For a discussion of how the physical injury requirement fails to further 
the goals of the PLRA and may be unconstitutional, see Jennifer Winslow, 
Comment, The Prison Litigation Reform Act’s Physical Injury Requirement 
Bars Meritorious Lawsuits: Was It Meant To?, 49 UCLA L. REV. 1655 (2002). 
108 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a) (2005). “Prospective relief . . . shall extend no 
further than necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right of a particular 
plaintiff.” Id. § 3626(a)(1)(A). “Preliminary injunctive relief must be narrowly 
drawn, extend no further than necessary to correct the harm the court finds 
requires preliminary relief, and be the least intrusive means necessary to correct 
that harm.” Id. § 3626(a)(2). 
109 Id. § 3626(a). “The court shall not grant or approve any prospective 
relief unless the court finds that such relief is narrowly drawn, extends no further 
than necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right, and is the least 
intrusive means necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right.” Id. 
110 See Nami v. Fauver, 82 F.3d 63 (3d Cir. 1996) (inmates housed in 
protective custody sought injunctive relief challenging conditions of their 
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In the context of prison sexual assault cases, the PLRA creates 
numerous procedural hurdles. Researchers have noted that the 
Act’s exhaustion requirement is particularly problematic because 
inmates fear retaliation from their assailants if they make use of 
administrative grievance procedures by reporting threats or even 
actual assaults.111 Further, the physical injury requirement calls for 
evidence that prison medical or psychiatric facilities may not 
reliably collect or maintain.112 Moreover, in seeking injunctive 
relief, prisoner-plaintiffs basing their claims on continuing threats 
of assault have a difficult burden in proving the likelihood that 
they will be attacked again in the future.113 Finally, the PLRA 
could limit relief to an order concerning a specific cellmate’s 
protective custody status, excluding broader suits that would 
protect other inmates as well.114 
                                                          
confinement in relation to general population inmates); Skinner v. Uphoff, 234 
F. Supp. 2d 1208 (D. Wyo. 2002) (inmates who suffered a risk of assault from 
their conditions of confinement at a Wyoming state prison prevailed in having 
the court instruct prison management to consent to enforcement of specific 
administrative regulations already in place at the facility). 
111 See Flint v. Ky. Dep’t of Corr., 270 F.3d 340 (6th Cir. 2001) (deciding a 
suit brought by a father after his son was murdered in prison by another inmate 
who mistakenly “accused Flint of ‘ratting’ on him”); Cindy Struckman-Johnson 
& David Struckman-Johnson, Sexual Coercion Rates in Seven Midwestern 
Prison Facilities for Men, 80 THE PRISON J. 379, 380 (2000). “[M]any 
researchers have noted that sexual assault is likely to be underreported by male 
inmates because of fears of reprisals, unwillingness to be a ‘snitch,’ and fear of 
being labeled a homosexual or weak.” Id. (citations omitted). 
112 Butler v. Dowd, 979 F.2d 661, 669 (8th Cir. 1992) (affirming plaintiffs’ 
award of nominal damages for multiple rapes because no “objective medical 
evidence supporting their physical injuries or detailing the extent of their 
emotional injuries” was presented at trial). 
113 Id. at 674 (“Although [plaintiff] claims that he is still subject to threats 
from fellow inmates, he does not claim that he is still subject to sexual 
assault.”). 
114 Cf. Miller v. French, 530 U.S. 327, 347 (2000) (holding that “[t]he 
PLRA has restricted courts’ authority to issue and enforce prospective relief 
concerning prison conditions, requiring that such relief be supported by findings 
and precisely tailored to what is needed to remedy the violation of a federal 
right”). 
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II. SUPERVISORY LIABILITY FOR INMATE-ON-INMATE ASSAULTS 
In Rhodes v. Chapman, the Supreme Court addressed the 
problem of prison overcrowding and held that officials have no 
general duty to make prisons “free of discomfort.”115 Officials in 
that case were not liable for inmate-on-inmate assaults under the 
Eighth Amendment where those assaults were claimed to be a 
result of overcrowded conditions and the double-celling of 
inmates.116 In Farmer v. Brennan, the Supreme Court heard the 
case of a prisoner who claimed an Eighth Amendment violation 
grounded in the fact that prison officials had imposed 
unconstitutional conditions on the prisoner specifically and had 
allowed the prisoner to be assaulted by other inmates.117 The 
“deliberate indifference” standard defined in that decision has 
                                                          
115 Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 336, 349 (1981). “[T]he Constitution 
does not mandate comfortable prisons, and prisons . . . which house persons 
convicted of serious crimes, cannot be free of discomfort.” Id. 
116 Id. at 342-43, 348-49. “As to violence, the [trial] court found that the 
number of acts of violence at [the prison] had increased with the prison 
population, but only in proportion to the increase in population. Respondents 
failed to produce evidence establishing that double celling itself caused greater 
violence . . . .” Id. at 342-43. This led the Court to hold that “there is no 
evidence that double celling under these circumstances either inflicts 
unnecessary or wanton pain or is grossly disproportionate to the severity of 
crimes warranting imprisonment.” Id. at 348. But see id. at 375. “There is no 
dispute that the prison was violent even before it become overcrowded, and that 
it has become more so. Contrary to the contention by the majority, I do not 
assert that violence has increased due to double celling. I accept the finding of 
the District Court that violence has increased due to overcrowding.” Id. 
(Marshall, J., dissenting) (emphases and citations excluded). 
117 Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1994). 
[Plaintiff’s] complaint alleged that respondents either transferred 
petitioner to [a particular facility] or placed petitioner in [that prison’s] 
general population despite knowledge that the penitentiary had a 
violent environment and a history of inmate assaults, and despite 
knowledge that petitioner, as a transsexual who “projects feminine 
characteristics,” would be particularly vulnerable to sexual attack by 
some [of the prison’s] inmates. This allegedly amounted to a 
deliberately indifferent failure to protect petitioner’s safety, and thus to 
a violation of petitioner’s Eighth Amendment rights. 
Id. at 830-31. 
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since been applied to claims in which there is a connection 
between a prison official’s conduct and the assault of an inmate by 
another inmate.118 Prisoners have sought to hold supervisors liable 
in this way for conditions such as those unsuccessfully challenged 
in Rhodes v. Chapman.119 Some circuits have held that when a 
prisoner’s particular double-cell assignment leads to a violent 
assault, a prison supervisor may be found liable for deliberate 
indifference to the prisoner’s safety.120 
A. THE FARMER DELIBERATE INDIFFERENCE STANDARD 
Following Estelle v. Gamble, federal courts differed with 
respect to the mental state required to subject prison officials to 
liability for prison conditions.121 Ten years after it considered the 
objective seriousness of injuries suffered by prisoners to find 
Eighth Amendment violations in Rhodes v. Chapman, the Court 
refocused the Eighth Amendment test on an inquiry into the 
mindset of prison officials in Wilson v. Seiter.122 The Court 
cautioned that a condition’s effect on an inmate was not 
determinative of a violation of the Eighth Amendment; rather, a 
prison official’s actions in subjecting an inmate to a specific 
condition of confinement, taken with deliberate indifference to the 
violation of an inmate’s rights, would determine the existence of 
an Eighth Amendment violation.123 
Almost twenty years after defining the deliberate indifference 
standard for conditions of confinement claims in Estelle v. 
                                                          
118 See infra Part II.B. 
119 See infra Part II.C. (discussing cases arising out of assaults that 
allegedly occurred because of prisons’ use of double-celling). 
120 See infra Part II.C. 
121 Compare Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 297 (1991) (“In Estelle v. 
Gamble . . . we said . . . only the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain 
implicates the Eighth Amendment”) (emphasis in original), with Stokes v. 
Delacambre, 710 F.2d 1120, 1126 (5th Cir. 1983) (describing that the decision 
in Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30 (1983), “specifically upheld a standard of 
recklessness”). 
122 Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294 (1991). 
123 Id. at 303. 
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Gamble, the Court decided Farmer v. Brennan and more clearly 
defined for the federal courts the requirements of the deliberate 
indifference standard.124 This clarification came in the context of a 
prison rape claim.125 Dee Farmer, an eighteen-year-old transsexual 
convicted of credit card fraud, was placed in the general population 
of a federal prison and was raped numerous times by fellow 
inmates.126 Farmer brought a pro se civil suit against the prison’s 
warden and guards for failing to protect her from an ongoing threat 
of foreseeable sexual assault.127 
The Farmer decision reaffirmed that conditions of confinement 
could be violative of the Eighth Amendment.128 Further, the Court 
set forth a two-prong test for determining when prison officials 
could be held liable for constitutional rights violations related to 
prison conditions.129 Under the first prong, courts must consider 
whether the prison conditions were “objectively, sufficiently 
serious.”130 This prong makes use of the standard set forth in 
                                                          
124 Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 828 (1994). 
125 Id. at 830 (stating that “according to petitioner’s allegations, petitioner 
was beaten and raped by another inmate in petitioner’s cell. . . . [P]etitioner then 
filed a Bivens complaint, alleging a violation of the Eighth Amendment”). 
126 Id. at 829 (describing that the plaintiff, Dee Farmer, “underwent 
estrogen therapy, received silicone breast implants, and submitted to 
unsuccessful ‘black-market’ testicle-removal surgery”); Farmer v. Brennan, 81 
F.3d 1444, 1445 (7th Cir. 1996). “Farmer is serving a twenty year federal 
sentence for credit card fraud, which was imposed in 1986 when she was 18 
years old.” Id. 
127 Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 829 (1994). This note uses the female 
pronoun to refer to Dee Farmer because, as stated by the Seventh Circuit in a 
decision following the Supreme Court’s remand of the case, “Farmer uses the 
female pronoun to refer to herself, despite the fact that she is still biologically 
male. We will respect that preference . . . .” Farmer v. Brennan, 81 F.3d 1444, 
1445 n.1 (7th Cir. 1996). 
128 Farmer, 511 U.S. at 832. “[T]reatment a prisoner receives in prison and 
the conditions under which he is confined are subject to scrutiny under the 
Eighth Amendment.” Id. (quoting Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 31 
(1993)). 
129 Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834. “[A] prison official violates the Eighth 
Amendment only when two requirements are met.” Id. 
130 Id. at 834 (citing Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298 (1991); Hudson v. 
McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 5 (1992)). 
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Rhodes v. Chapman, which requires that the conditions challenged 
must deprive a plaintiff of a human need.131 To claim that prison 
officials failed to prevent a violation of an inmate’s need for safety 
under the objective prong, a plaintiff must demonstrate “conditions 
posing a substantial risk of serious harm.”132 
Under the second prong, the Court must determine whether 
prison officials had a “sufficiently culpable state of mind.”133 In 
clarifying the subjective prong of the standard, the Court 
considered both civil standards for liability as well as different 
criminal mental states.134 Although prisoners’ rights litigation 
consists of civil lawsuits, the Court adopted something akin to the 
criminal standard of “subjective recklessness.”135 The result was a 
                                                          
131 Id. at 834 (holding that “a prison official’s act or omission must result in 
the denial of the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities”) (citing Rhodes 
v. Chapman, 425 U.S. 337, 347 (1981)). 
132 Id. at 834. “For a claim (like the one here) based on a failure to prevent 
harm, the inmate must show that he is incarcerated under conditions posing a 
substantial risk of serious harm.” Id. (citing McKinney, 509 U.S. at 35). 
133  Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. As described by Judge Posner in a Seventh 
Circuit prisoner rape case: 
Prison employees who act with deliberate indifference to the inmates’ 
safety violate the Eighth Amendment. But to be guilty of “deliberate 
indifference” they must know they are creating a substantial risk of 
bodily harm. If they place a prisoner in a cell that has a cobra, but they 
do not know that there is a cobra there (or even that there is a high 
probability that there is a cobra there), they are not guilty of deliberate 
indifference even if they should have known about the risk, that is, 
even if they were negligent—even grossly negligent or even reckless in 
the tort sense—in failing to know. But if they know that there is a cobra 
there or at least that there is a high probability of a cobra there, and do 
nothing, that is deliberate indifference. 
Billman v. Indiana Dep’t of Corr., 56 F.3d 785, 788 (7th Cir. 1995) (citations 
omitted). 
134 Farmer, 511 U.S. at 836-37. “With deliberate indifference lying 
somewhere between the poles of negligence at one end and purpose or 
knowledge at the other,” the Court considered the civil and criminal standards of 
“recklessness,” as well as the civil liability standard of “gross negligence.” Id. at 
836-37; see also id. at 836 n.4 (dismissing gross negligence as “typically 
meaning little different from recklessness as generally understood in the civil 
law”). 
135 Id. at 839-40 (stating “subjective recklessness as used in the criminal 
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deliberate indifference standard “somewhere between the poles of 
negligence at one end and purpose or knowledge at the other.”136 
The threshold for this standard is that an official must have been 
aware or should have been aware of the unconstitutional conditions 
established under the objective prong.137 The Court noted that, in 
Dee Farmer’s case, the record contained statements by some 
defendants admitting knowledge of Farmer’s vulnerability to 
sexual assault.138 The Supreme Court generally limited the liability 
of prison supervisors, however, by suggesting that “it remains open 
to the [defendant] officials to prove that they were unaware even of 
an obvious risk to inmate health and safety.”139 
Despite this difficult standard, the language of the Farmer 
decision suggests that demonstrating prison conditions that present 
a general threat of rape may be sufficient to satisfy both the 
objective and subjective prongs of the deliberate indifference 
test.140 Courts thus might presume that a defendant had notice of a 
                                                          
law is a familiar and workable standard that is consistent with the Cruel and 
Unusual Punishments Clause”). 
136 Id. at 836. 
137 Id. at 837 (holding “a prison official cannot be found liable under the 
Eighth Amendment for denying an inmate humane conditions of confinement 
unless the official knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate safety”). 
138 Id. at 848-49. 
For example, in papers filed in opposition to respondents’ summary-
judgment motion, petitioner pointed to respondents’ admission that 
petitioner is a “non-violent” transsexual who, because of petitioner’s 
“youth and feminine appearance” is “likely to experience a great deal 
of sexual pressure” in prison. And petitioner recounted a statement by 
one of the respondents, then warden of the penitentiary in Lewisburg, 
Pennsylvania, who told petitioner that there was “a high probability that 
[petitioner] could not safely function at USP-Lewisburg” an incident 
confirmed in a published District Court opinion. 
Id. (citations omitted). 
139 Farmer, 511 U.S. at 844. 
140 Id. at 842-43. 
For example, if an Eighth Amendment plaintiff presents evidence 
showing that a substantial risk of inmate attacks was longstanding, 
pervasive, well-documented, or expressly noted by prison officials in 
the past, and the circumstances suggest that the defendant-official being 
sued had been exposed to information concerning the risk and thus 
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threat to the plaintiff because the prison’s conditions posed such an 
obvious risk to all inmates.141 Plaintiffs may show that a risk was 
“long-standing, pervasive, well-documented or expressly noted by 
prison officials in the past” and then link this information to their 
supervisors’ awareness of the threat.142 
Under Farmer, “[a] failure to give advance notice is not 
dispositive”;143 rather, “a factfinder may conclude that a prison 
official knew of a substantial risk from the very fact that the risk 
was obvious.”144 Prior to Farmer, a prison guard or supervisor 
could be held deliberately indifferent only when an inmate 
reported a threat from a particular, identified aggressor.145 In 
Farmer, however, the Court held that prison officials may be held 
liable when they are aware of a risk to an inmate despite their not 
knowing by whom that inmate is threatened.146 The Farmer 
decision focused the inquiry of courts on the conduct of prison 
officials rather than on prisoners’ own steps to inform prison 
                                                          
“must have known” about it, then such evidence could be sufficient to 
permit a trier of fact to find that the defendant-official had actual 
knowledge of the risk. 
Id. 
141 Thus, when a defendant is aware of prison conditions generally, “a fact 
finder may conclude that a prison official knew of a substantial risk from the 
very fact that the risk was obvious.” Id. at 842. 
142 Id. 
143 Id. at 848. 
144 Id. at 842. 
145 McGill v. Duckworth, 944 F.2d 344, 349-50 (7th Cir. 1991) (deciding 
inmate-on-inmate rape claim prior to Farmer and holding that “[o]ther circuits 
have held that failure to tell prison officials about threats is fatal and have 
dismissed such claims at the pleading stage”) (citing Ruefly v. Landon, 825 F.2d 
792 (4th Cir. 1987); Blankenship v. Meachum, 840 F.2d 741 (10th Cir. 1988)). 
146 Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 843 (1994). “Nor may a prison 
official escape liability for deliberate indifference by showing that, while he was 
aware of an obvious risk to inmate safety, he did not know that the complainant 
was especially likely to be assaulted by the specific prisoner who eventually 
committed the assault.” Id. For examples of courts using this language in 
determining deliberate indifference, see Greene v. Bowles, 361 F.3d 290, 294 
(6th Cir. 2004); Krein v. Norris, 309 F.3d 487, 491-92 (8th Cir. 2002); Lopez v. 
LeMaster, 172 F.3d 756, 762 n.5 (10th Cir. 1999). 
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officials of aggressive conduct by other inmates.147 
The Court also held that defendants may prevail “if they 
responded reasonably to the risk even if the harm ultimately was 
not averted.”148 Indeed, the official’s response could preclude a 
prisoner’s claim for an injunction, even if that response postdates 
litigation.149 A prisoner seeking injunctive relief must demonstrate 
a threat of future harm “in light of the prison authorities’ current 
attitudes and conduct”;150 thus, the defendants “could prevent 
issuance of an injunction by proving, during the litigation, that they 
were no longer unreasonably disregarding an objectively 
intolerable risk of harm and that they would not revert to their 
obduracy upon cessation of the litigation.”151 
B. Supervisors’ Liability for Reported or Obvious Threats of 
Harm 
Following from the Supreme Court’s precedents stating that 
personal safety is a human need that cannot be deprived under the 
Eighth Amendment,152 prisoners who are the victims of assault 
may try to hold prison supervisors directly liable for not preventing 
                                                          
147  Farmer, 511 U.S. at 843-44. “If, for example, prison officials were 
aware that inmate rape was so common and uncontrolled . . . it would be 
obviously irrelevant to liability that the officials could not guess beforehand 
precisely who would attack [victims of assault].” Id. 
148 Id. at 844. 
149 Id. at 847 n.9 (“[E]ven prison officials who had a subjectively culpable 
state of mind when the lawsuit was filed could prevent issuance of an injunction 
by proving, during the litigation, that they were no longer unreasonably 
disregarding an objectively intolerable risk of harm and that they would not 
revert to their obduracy upon cessation of the litigation.”). 
150 Id. at 845 (emphasis added). 
151 Id. at 847 n.9. 
152 Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 33 (1994). “The [Eighth] 
Amendment, as we have said, requires that inmates be furnished with the basic 
human needs, one of which is ‘reasonable safety.’ It is ‘cruel and unusual 
punishment to hold convicted criminals in unsafe conditions.’” Id. (citing 
Deshaney v. Winnebago County Dep’t of Social Serv., 489 U.S. 189, 200 
(1989); Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 315-16 (1982)). 
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their harm.153 Without evidence establishing a direct connection 
between an official’s own conduct and an inmate’s harm, however, 
a warden or corrections official will be liable only for inmate-on-
inmate assaults the circumstances of which were within the 
official’s control.154 As with other types of Section 1983 claims, 
wardens and other supervisors will not be held liable for claims 
against prison guards through respondeat superior.155 Rather, the 
series of factors listed by Professor Kinports and quoted above will 
be applied to determine supervisory liability in prisoner assault 
cases.156 
                                                          
153 See, e.g., Johnson v. Johnson, 385 F.3d 503, 512 (5th Cir. 2004) (“This 
is a § 1983 suit brought by a former Texas prisoner against . . . defendant prison 
officials [who] failed to protect him from prison gangs who repeatedly raped 
him.”); Greene v. Bowles, 361 F.3d 290, 292 (6th Cir. 2004) (reviewing a 
“[Section] 1983 suit against Warden Brigano and other prison officials resulting 
out of an attack on Greene by another inmate”); Weiss v. Cooley, 230 F.3d 
1027, 1029 (7th Cir. 2000) (addressing a claim by the plaintiff “that the jail 
officials put him with other inmates who the officials knew would attack him”). 
154 LaMarca v. Turner, 662 F. Supp. 647, 663 (S.D. Fla. 1987). “Where the 
defendants hold supervisory positions, vicarious liability will not suffice.” Id. 
(citing Monell v. Dep’t of Social Serv., 436 U.S. 658 (1978) for the proposition 
that a municipality will not be vicariously liable for the acts of its employees 
absent evidence that the injury inflicted was the result of official policy). 
155 “Respondeat superior or vicarious liability will not attach under § 
1983.” City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 385 (1989) (citing Monell, 436 
U.S. at 694-95). 
156 Kinports, supra note 42, at 169. 
[T]he courts of appeals tend to agree that five interrelated factors ought 
to be considered in . . . determining whether a particular supervisor is 
liable on the facts of a given case: (1) the extent to which prior similar 
incidents have occurred; (2) the supervisor’s response to those prior 
incidents; (3) the supervisor’s response to the specific incident on 
which the suit is based; (4) the extent to which the supervisor can be 
considered a cause of the violation; and (5) the nature of the 
supervisor’s awareness of the constitutional misconduct. 
Id. These same factors have been used by courts considering supervisory 
liability in inmate-on-inmate assault cases. For consideration of the occurrence 
of prior similar incidents, see Skinner v. Uphoff, 234 F. Supp. 2d 1208, 1214 (D. 
Wyo. 2002). The court granted plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment on a 
claim of unconstitutional conditions at a prison, in part because the plaintiffs 
demonstrated that “between one hundred and three hundred inmate assaults” 
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In a case brought under Section 1983, one of the factors to be 
considered in assessing supervisory liability is the supervisor’s 
awareness of the constitutional misconduct for which the plaintiff 
brings suit.157 Under the Farmer standard, a plaintiff-inmate has 
                                                          
occurred at the prison during a six year period without sufficient response from 
prison supervisors.” Id. at 1214. The supervisor’s response to prior incidents was 
considered in Ware v. Jackson County, 150 F.3d 873 (8th Cir. 1998). The court 
in that case affirmed a denial of the defendant county’s motion for judgment as a 
matter of law in a suit over the plaintiff’s rape by a subordinate corrections 
officer. The court stated that the corrections supervisors “were informed of the 
first set of allegations against [the subordinate]. However, there is no evidence 
that they were instructed to increase their supervision of [the subordinate].” Id. 
at 884. The defendant-supervisor’s response to the incident before the court was 
a factor in Giroux v. Somerset County, 178 F.3d 28, 34 (1st Cir. 1999). By that 
decision, the court reversed summary judgment of inmate’s claim against a 
supervisor, where “[a] juror could find that [defendant]’s abdication of his 
responsibility [to alert subordinates on his shift of plaintiff’s protective status], 
in the face of such a known danger to [plaintiff]’s safety, was a reckless 
dereliction of duty.” Id. at 34. The extent to which the supervisor himself caused 
the alleged incident was an important consideration in Hale v. Tallapposa 
County, 50 F.3d 1579 (11th Cir. 1995). Summary judgment for a jail supervisor 
was reversed where the plaintiff “presented sufficient proof of causation to 
survive summary judgment,” by presenting evidence 
sufficient to support a reasonable jury determination that the excessive 
risk of violence [at the facility] flowed from an atmosphere of 
deliberate indifference reflected in [the supervisor]’s failure to classify 
or segregate violent from non-violent inmates, assign inmates to cells 
or beds, adequately train the jailers, and adequately supervise and 
monitor the inmates. 
Id. at 1584-85. Finally, the court looked to the supervisor’s awareness of 
constitutional misconduct in Skinner v. Uphoff, 234 F. Supp. 2d 1208 (D. Wyo. 
2002). Prison supervisors were found liable on a failure-to-discipline claim 
because they “admitted their knowledge of a substantial risk of serious harm to 
inmates, as well as their failure to discipline subordinates or take any other 
corrective action. In light of the undisputed facts, their failure to disciple 
amount[ed] to deliberate indifference.” Id. at 1216. Also, in Daskalea v. District 
of Columbia, the court affirmed the district’s liability for negligent supervision 
where the plaintiff inmate’s Eighth Amendment rights were violated by 
“persistent, open and notorious conduct,” which supervisors “failed to notice, let 
alone stop.” 227 F.3d 433, 445 (D.C. Cir. 2000). 
157 Kinports, supra note 42, at 180-81.  
The final factor that the courts of appeals tend to consider in 
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the best chance of proving the subjective prong of deliberate 
indifference when the inmate can show that he reported a threat of 
assault to the supervisor-defendant.158 For example, a plaintiff in 
Arkansas who had been sexually assaulted in prison claimed that 
the warden of his facility was liable because the warden had 
reviewed some of the prisoner’s requests for a change in cell 
assignment.159 The trial court granted the warden judgment as a 
matter of law, holding that he lacked subjective knowledge of the 
risk to the plaintiff.160 The Eighth Circuit, in Spruce v. Sargent, 
reversed this finding on the basis of evidence that the warden had 
also received reports that were filed by the prisoner after his 
cellmate forced him to perform oral sex.161 The court held that this 
evidence was sufficient for a jury to find that the warden had the 
notice required for deliberate indifference.162 
In determining whether to hold supervisors liable under Section 
1983 for inmate-on-inmate assaults, courts also consider “the 
extent to which the supervisor can be considered a cause of the 
violation.”163 Officials can be linked to a deprivation of 
                                                          
determining a supervisor’s liability for her subordinate’s 
unconstitutional behavior is the nature of the supervisor’s awareness of 
the risk of constitutional injury. The greater the supervisor’s awareness 
of the problem, the more culpable she seems and the more likely the 
courts are to conclude that their particular standard of supervisory 
liability is met. 
Id. 
158 McGill v. Duckworth, 944 F.2d 344, 349-50 (7th Cir. 1991). “Other 
circuits have held that failure to tell prison officials about threats is fatal and 
have dismissed such claims at the pleading stage.” Id. (citing Fourth Circuit and 
Tenth Circuit cases). 
159 Spruce v. Sargent, 149 F.3d 783, 786 (8th Cir. 1998). 
160 Id. at 785. 
161 Id. at 786. 
162 Id. The Court of Appeals held “that there was sufficient evidence from 
which a jury could conclude that Warden Sargent knew Spruce was subject to an 
excessive risk of harm from sexual assault.” Id. 
163 Kinports, supra note 42, at 178. 
Given Section 1983’s requirement that the defendant “subject[ ]” the 
plaintiff to a violation of her constitutional rights or “cause[ ] [her] to 
be [so] subjected,” and the Supreme Court’s requirement in Rizzo v. 
Goode of an “affirmative link” between the supervisory official and the 
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constitutional rights when their failure to train subordinates caused 
those subordinates to act with deliberate indifference.164 The 
connection between the resulting harm and the supervisor must be 
established through proof that the failure to train employees 
actually led to the violation of the individual’s constitutional 
rights.165 
In Lopez v. LeMaster, the Tenth Circuit found that plaintiff 
Genaro Lopez failed to establish such a connection between a 
government supervisor and the inmate-on-inmate assault he 
suffered.166 Lopez was an arrestee in the Jackson County jail in 
Oklahoma and was placed in a general population cell, where he 
was threatened by another inmate.167 Although he reported the 
threat to his jailer, the jailer returned Lopez to the same cell; Lopez 
was subsequently beaten so severely as to leave jail the next day 
with a concussion and a strained spine.168 Lopez brought suit 
against the sheriff who supervised the jail, claiming that the jailer 
                                                          
plaintiff’s constitutional injury, causation issues often arise in cases 
involving supervisory liability. 
Id. 
164 See City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378 (1989) (finding municipality 
liability in § 1983 suit for inadequate training of police that led to constitutional 
rights violations); Walker v. City of New York, 974 F.2d 293, 297 (2d Cir. 
1992) “[M]any § 1983 claims against municipalities [are molded] into ‘failure to 
train’ or ‘failure to supervise’ claims. It is only by casting claims in this way that 
plaintiffs can link an actual decision by a high level municipal official to a 
challenged incident.” Id. The court went on to discuss the application of City of 
Canton v. Harris to a claim that New York City was liable for its failure to train 
police not to cover up exculpatory evidence or to commit perjury. 
165 See Wilson v. Town of Mendon, 294 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 2002). “Liability 
will attach to the municipal employer . . . where a specific deficiency in training 
is the ‘moving force’ behind a constitutional injury.” Id. (citing City of Canton 
v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388-89, 391); Currier v. Doran, 242 F.3d 905, 923 (10th 
Cir. 2001). “[W]hen a superior’s failure to train amounts to deliberate 
indifference to the rights of persons with whom his subordinates come into 
contact, the inadequacy of training may serve as the basis for § 1983 liability.” 
Id. (quotations and citations omitted). 
166 Lopez v. LeMaster, 172 F.3d 756, 760 (10th Cir. 1999). 
167 Id. at 758. 
168 Id. at 758-59. 
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to whom he complained was not properly trained.169 This failure-
to-train claim could not be sustained, however, because following 
his assault Lopez could not identify the jailer to whom he had 
reported the incident.170 In addressing Lopez’s appeal of a 
summary judgment order against him, the Tenth Circuit held that 
the identity of the jailer was necessary in order to establish the 
sheriff’s liability.171 Lopez was unable to demonstrate that the 
particular jailer to whom he had complained had in fact not been 
trained or that his training had been insufficient.172 Lopez’s suit 
survived, however, on his separate claim that the sheriff was 
generally responsible for the conditions at the jail.173 
In Section 1983 cases against government supervisors, courts 
also consider the supervisors’ responses to the alleged 
constitutional violations as well as similar prior incidents in 
determining liability.174 Putting in place measures that are known 
                                                          
169 Id. at 760 (“Appellant alleges that his jailer’s acts and omissions were 
the result of Sheriff LeMaster’s failure to provide adequate training and 
supervision of jail personnel.”) 
170 Id. 
171 Id. 
172 Lopez v. LeMaster, 172 F.3d 756, 760 (10th Cir. 1999).  
Appellant has presented no evidence concerning deficiencies in training 
of the particular jailer involved in his case. Nor has he shown that the 
county had a policy of providing its jailers with insufficient training in 
the areas closely related to his ultimate injury from which we might 
infer that his particular jailer’s training also was insufficient. 
Id. 
173 Id. at 760-62. See infra text accompanying notes 179-82. 
174 Kinports, supra note 42, at 174-78. “As a general rule, the courts are 
more likely to find a supervisor liable the less adequate the remedial steps she 
has taken in response to prior violations.” Id. at 174. 
The third factor that some courts of appeals consider in determining a 
supervisor’s liability for her subordinate’s constitutional wrong is the 
nature of the supervisor’s response to the particular incident that led to 
the suit. Although some courts refuse to take this factor into account on 
the grounds that the supervisor’s conduct subsequent to the 
constitutional violation cannot in any way have contributed to it, other 
courts view the supervisor’s failure to respond appropriately to the 
violation as evidence that she was deliberately indifferent to it or 
acquiesced in it and therefore met whatever standard of culpability the 
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to be ineffective or enacting policies that are then not enforced will 
not satisfy the duty of officials to prevent harm.175 Once an 
awareness of a threat to inmates is established, supervising 
officials have a duty to discipline subordinates who are complacent 
about potential harm to inmates.176 Officials may be found 
deliberately indifferent if, after a general risk to inmate safety 
becomes known, they fail in their duty to prevent future assaults.177 
Courts have found that plaintiffs’ claims are sufficient when they 
assert that unsafe conditions at corrections facilities were caused 
by supervisors’ deliberate indifference and the claims are 
supported by evidence that prison officials knew of a general risk 
of rape to inmates.178 
                                                          
court has chosen. 
Id. at 177. 
175 See Daskalea v. District of Columbia, 227 F.3d 433, 442 (D.C. Cir. 
2000) (affirming liability of the director of D.C. corrections for an inmate’s 
sexual harassment despite the correctional facility’s maintenance of a sexual 
harassment policy because “a ‘paper’ policy cannot insulate a municipality from 
liability where there is evidence . . . that the municipality was deliberately 
indifferent to the policy’s violation”); Berry v. City of Muskogee, 900 F.2d 
1489, 1499 (10th Cir. 1990) (holding that the practice of not locking down 
violent inmates contributed to assaults, therefore continuation of that policy 
made supervisors liable). 
176 Ware v. Jackson County, 150 F.3d 873, 883 (8th Cir. 1998), reh’g 
denied, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 22587 (holding that the facility director “knew 
of allegations” of sexual abuse by corrections officers against inmates and the 
“failure to discipline adequately was regarded as evidence of deliberate 
indifference”). 
177 Id. at 884 (holding that the jury’s finding of supervisory liability for 
corrections officers’ sexual misconduct was supported by defendant director’s 
failure to “order any precautionary measures to protect . . . inmates from being 
further victimized”). 
178 See Krein v. Norris, 309 F.3d 487, 488 (8th Cir. 2002) (claiming that 
defendant was deliberately indifferent to inmate safety, plaintiff alleges liability 
for “failing to provide adequate security”); Spruce v. Sargent, 149 F.3d 783, 786 
(8th Cir. 1998) (upholding liability of a defendant warden when, during trial, 
that warden testified that “inmates had to ‘fight’ against sexual aggressors . . . . 
These statements amount to direct evidence of Warden Sargent’s knowledge of 
the risk of sexual assault and/or rape in the unit”); Taylor v. Mich. Dep’t of 
Corr., 69 F.3d 76, 77 (6th Cir. 1995) (“The heart of plaintiff’s Eighth 
Amendment claim is that Warden Foltz . . . neither had a policy to identify and 
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On those grounds, the Tenth Circuit recognized the claim of 
Lopez against Sheriff LeMaster, even though Lopez could not 
identify the guard to whom he had reported a threat of assault.179 
Absent evidence to demonstrate that the sheriff’s failure to 
supervise a particular jailer caused his harm, Lopez argued that the 
sheriff was liable for “constitutionally infirm conditions at the jail” 
that also contributed to his injuries.180 Using standards of the 
Oklahoma Department of Health as “persuasive authority 
concerning what is required” to ensure inmate safety, the Tenth 
Circuit held that Lopez had stated a sufficient claim “that the 
sheriff was aware of and disregarded an excessive risk to inmate 
health and safety by failing to take reasonable measures to abate 
the risk.”181 The court held that prior attacks at the jail could have 
put the sheriff on notice of the unsafe conditions, and an admission 
by the sheriff following a suicide at the jail served as “evidence 
that [the sheriff] was aware of the risk of harm to inmates resulting 
from inadequate supervision, and failed to take reasonable 
measures to prevent it.”182 Thus, Lopez ultimately survived the 
defendant’s summary judgment motion based on the defendant’s 
awareness of general conditions at his facility, rather than his 
awareness of conditions of confinement specific to Lopez. 
The Supreme Court held in Farmer that “a subjective approach 
to deliberate indifference does not require a prisoner seeking a 
remedy for unsafe conditions to await a tragic event such as an 
actual assault before obtaining relief.”183 However, the Tenth 
                                                          
screen those potential transferees who would not be safe in the camp nor created 
guidelines for prison staff to follow when screening inmates for transfer.”); 
Skinner v. Uphoff, 234 F. Supp. 2d 1208, 1209 (D. Wyo. 2002) (holding 
defendants liable in a class action suit where an “Eighth Amendment ‘failure to 
protect’ case [arose] out of a challenge to the existing conditions at the 
Wyoming State Penitentiary” at which inmate-on-inmate assaults were common 
but went unaddressed). 
179 Lopez v. LeMaster, 172 F.3d 756 (10th Cir. 1999). For the facts of this 
case, see text accompanying notes 92-97. 
180 Id. at 760-64 (considering “Sheriff LeMaster’s individual liability for 
these conditions”). 
181 Id. at 760-61 (citations omitted). 
182 Id. at 762. 
183 Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 846 (1994) (internal quotations 
RIES MACROED CORRECTED 053105.DOC 6/6/2005 1:43 PM 
 THE PRISON RAPE ELIMINATION ACT 953 
Circuit’s reasoning in Lopez v. LeMaster suggests that the claims 
of prison rape victims will be made stronger through proof of a 
general lack of safety at the facilities in which the claimants were 
housed.184 In a more recent decision by the Seventh Circuit, 
Riccardo v. Rausch, the court went so far as to require evidence of 
general conditions in order to demonstrate an objective harm from 
the likelihood that a sexual assault would occur.185 The plaintiff in 
that case reported to a guard that he felt threatened by a particular 
inmate with whom he was subsequently assigned to share a cell.186 
The inmate brought suit against the guard, and a jury found that the 
defendant knew that Riccardo faced a threat of serious harm from 
the new cell assignment.187 The court reversed, holding that the 
subjective prong of the Farmer standard requires a jury to consider 
facility-wide data in order to reasonably find that a serious risk was 
known to a defendant.188 The Seventh Circuit held that “a 
                                                          
omitted). 
184 See also, Taylor v. Mich. Dep’t of Corr., 69 F.3d 76 (6th Cir. 1995) 
(denying defendant corrections supervisor’s summary judgment motion because 
conditions at correctional facility were enough evidence to create a question of 
fact as to defendant’s deliberately indifference). 
185 Riccardo v. Rausch, 375 F.3d 521 (7th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 125 S. 
Ct. 1589 (2005). The Seventh Circuit reversed a jury award of $1.5 million to an 
inmate who was sexually assaulted by a cellmate after he had reported to a guard 
that he felt threatened by that cellmate. 
186 Id. at 525. 
187 Id. at 527. 
188 Id. at 527-28. 
[T]here may be other ways to show both an objectively serious risk and 
the guards’ knowledge of that risk. For example, Riccardo might have 
attempted to demonstrate that there is a strong correlation between 
prisoners’ professions of fear and actual violence. How many murders 
(or homosexual assaults) occur in [the facility where plaintiff was 
incarcerated] (or the Illinois prison system) per hundred inmate-years 
of custody? How many violent events were preceded by requests for 
protection? How many requests for protection were dishonored, yet 
nothing untoward happened? Data along these lines would have 
enabled a jury (and the court) to evaluate actual risks even though 
Riccardo was unable to show that [the defendant] should have deemed 
[the cellmate] to present an especial risk. If violence is common at [the 
prison], and inmates have good track records in identifying potential 
RIES MACROED CORRECTED 053105.DOC 6/6/2005 1:43 PM 
954 JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY 
prisoner’s bare assertion [of a risk] is not enough to make the 
guard subjectively aware of a risk, if the objective indicators do not 
substantiate the inmate’s assertion.”189 
C. Supervisory Liability for Deliberately Indifferent Cell 
Assignments 
In applying Farmer, a number of circuits have recognized that 
the objective prong of the deliberate indifference standard may be 
satisfied when a prisoner is housed in disregard of the threat that 
the placement may pose.190 In Rhodes v. Chapman, the Supreme 
Court held that, as a general practice, “double-celling” inmates 
                                                          
aggressors, then guards who do not have their heads in the sand must 
actually (that is, subjectively) understand the risk an inmate faces when 
a protest is disregarded. But if violence is rare, or if there is poor 
correlation between inmates’ alarums and subsequent violence, then 
Riccardo’s initial protest would not have provided [the defendant] with 
actual knowledge of an impending assault. . . . [A] prisoner’s bare 
assertion is not enough to make the guard subjectively aware of a risk, 
if the objective indicators do not substantiate the inmate’s assertion. 
Id. 
189 Id. at 528. 
190 See Greene v. Bowles, 361 F.3d 290 (6th Cir. 2004) (reversing summary 
judgment because a jury could find warden liable for plaintiff’s placement in 
unit with a dangerous inmate who later attacked plaintiff); Riccardo v. Rausch, 
375 F.3d 521, 527 (7th Cir. 2004) (hypothesizing liability if, on similar facts, 
plaintiff had been placed in a cell with an inmate known to be a sexual 
predator); Durrell v. Cook, 71 Fed. Appx. 718, 719 (9th Cir. 2003) (reversing 
summary judgment because a jury could find prison officials liable where the 
plaintiff was “double-celled with an aggressive homosexual”); Calderon-Ortiz v. 
Laboy-Alvarado, 300 F.3d 60, 63 (1st Cir. 2002) (reversing the dismissal of the 
plaintiff’s claim that the detention facility in which he was held “did not take 
measures to separate and house inmates according to their safety needs and the 
security risks they posed” and that this led to the plaintiff’s rape); Nami v. 
Fauver, 82 F.3d 63, 67 (3d Cir. 1996) (reversing dismissal of plaintiff’s claim 
against supervisors of juvenile detention facility where “complaint alleged that 
the increase in rapes and other assaults was a result of double-celling”). See also 
James v. Tilghman, 194 F.R.D. 408, 417 (D. Conn. 1999) (denying post-trial 
motions on the grounds that “the jury found fault with defendants’ continued 
placement of [the assailant] in a cellblock with new prison admittees, despite 
strong suggestion of [the assailant’s] sexual proclivities”). 
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does not violate the Eighth Amendment.191 In addition to decisions 
that have explicitly held that double-celling resulting in rape can be 
unconstitutional, circuits have broadened the holding of Rhodes so 
that conditions that deprive inmates of physical safety generally 
can constitute cruel and unusual punishment.192 
In 1996, the Third Circuit interpreted the Rhodes holding in 
Nami v. Fauver, a case brought by prisoners at a youth detention 
center against the commissioner of the New Jersey Department of 
Corrections and other correctional officials.193 The plaintiffs sued 
under Section 1983, claiming cruel and unusual punishment due to 
their confinement in double-celled units.194 Included was the 
allegation that “[d]ouble-celling has resulted in rapes and other 
assaults, as well as psychological stress.”195 The district court had 
considered these allegations, but had dismissed the case, “finding 
that the claim based on these allegations lacked merit because the 
plaintiffs failed to show deliberate indifference.”196 In reversing 
the lower court’s decision, the Third Circuit held that if the 
defendants were on notice that rapes had occurred at the facility 
and knew that double-celling contributed to that occurrence, a jury 
could find that “all officials were deliberately indifferent to the 
possibility that the conditions under which they housed the 
plaintiffs significantly increased the possibility of such well-known 
harms as prison rape.”197 
The Sixth Circuit has twice held, in cases involving transsexual 
                                                          
191 Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337 (1981). 
192 Barrett, Note, supra note 24, at 412-13, 422 (discussing the adoption of 
a “core conditions” standard for assessing the constitutionality of prison 
conditions and finding that the Eighth Circuit, the D.C. Circuit and the Second 
Circuit, have each adopted a test whereby double-celling could be a deprivation 
of physical safety on specific facts, and thus violate the Eighth Amendment 
under Rhodes). 
193 Nami v. Fauver, 82 F.3d 63, 65 (3d Cir. 1996). 
194 Id. 
195 Id. at 65-66. 
196 Id. at 66 (internal quotations omitted). 
197 Id. at 68. The Court held that notice could be established through letters 
that the plaintiffs claimed to have written to the defendants. Id. at 67. This was 
an appeal of a motion to dismiss, so no substantial record existed for the basis of 
this decision.  
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prisoners as plaintiffs, that supervisors may be held liable when 
prisoners’ placements leave them vulnerable to assault.198 Taylor v. 
Michigan Department of Corrections came before the Sixth Circuit 
on an appeal of the defendant’s qualified immunity from suit prior 
to the Farmer decision.199 In 1995, the plaintiff appealed a second 
summary judgment order on the issue of whether the defendant 
warden could be held liable for a subordinate’s deliberate 
indifference in transferring the plaintiff-prisoner to a facility that 
“posed a substantial risk of serious harm to prisoners like 
plaintiff.”200 The Sixth Circuit held that the warden could be found 
liable for “abandoning the specific duties of his position—–
adopting and implementing an operating procedure that would 
require a review of the inmate’s files before authorizing the 
transfers—in the face of actual knowledge of a breakdown in the 
proper workings of the department.”201 More recently, in Greene v. 
Bowles, the Sixth Circuit held that a prison warden could be liable 
for assaults on a vulnerable prisoner by a predatory inmate who 
had been placed in the same unit.202 
Just as the Sixth Circuit found a viable claim in Taylor for a 
supervisor’s failure to implement “an operating procedure” that 
could have prevented an inmate’s sexual assault, so too has the 
First Circuit held supervisors liable for the failure of classification 
                                                          
198 Greene v. Bowles, 361 F.3d 290, 293-94 (6th Cir. 2004) (reversing 
summary judgment and holding that defendant Warden Brigano could be held 
liable for an attack on the plaintiff because Greene’s placement in protective 
custody “without segregation or protective measures presented a substantial risk 
to her safety of which Warden Brigano was aware”); Taylor v. Mich. Dep’t of 
Corr., 69 F.3d 76, 77 (6th Cir. 1995) (reversing summary judgment and holding 
that defendant-warden could be liable for “disregard[ing] a risk of harm of 
which he was aware—by failing to adopt reasonable policies to protect inmates 
like Taylor”). 
199 Taylor, 69 F.3d at 78-79. 
200 Id. at 77. 
201 Id. at 81. The Court went on to hold that “[a] jury could find on the facts 
that Foltz personally had a job to do, and that he did not do it.” Id. at 81. 
202 Greene, 361 F.3d at 293-94 (holding that “Greene has raised an issue of 
fact as to Warden Brigano’s knowledge of a risk to her safety because of her 
status as a vulnerable inmate and because of Frezzell’s status as a predatory 
inmate”). 
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and placement systems at their facilities.203 The plaintiff in 
Calderon-Ortiz v. Laboy appealed to the First Circuit when the 
district court dismissed the plaintiff’s claim against supervisors at a 
pretrial detention facility for their “failure to afford adequate 
protection to inmates from attack by other inmates.”204 Applying 
Farmer, the First Circuit held that the supervisors as well as the 
guards at the facility “could have inferred that Calderon was at risk 
of being sexually assaulted” based on a general risk to inmates 
allegedly caused by the defendants’ “practice of not enforcing 
policies of the [Corrections Administration] to ensure that weak, 
vulnerable inmates are housed separately from stronger, dangerous 
inmates.”205 
Most recently, in 2003, the Ninth Circuit held that, in 
challenging his double-celled housing arrangement with a 
“sexually aggressive cellmate,” a prisoner-plaintiff had asserted a 
claim of deliberate indifference sufficient to survive the 
defendants’ summary judgment motion.206 The notice to the 
defendants in that case came from the prison’s computer records, 
which indicated that the plaintiff’s cellmate had a history of 
assaults and rape.207 Existence of those computer records was 
                                                          
203 Compare Taylor v. Mich. Dep’t of Corr., 69 F.3d 76, 81 (6th Cir. 1995) 
(holding defendant liable for “abandoning the specific duties of his position—–
adopting and implementing an operating procedure that would require a review 
of the inmate’s files before authorizing the transfers . . . .”), with Calderon-Ortiz 
v. Laboy-Alvarado, 300 F.3d 60, 63 (1st Cir. 2002) (reversing dismissal of 
plaintiff’s claim that his sodomy while imprisoned was the result of the 
institution “not tak[ing] measures to separate and house inmates according to 
their safety needs and the security risks they posed”). 
204 Calderon-Ortiz v. Laboy-Alvarado, 300 F.3d 60, 63 (1st Cir. 2002). The 
plaintiff brought his claim under the Fifth Amendment because he challenged 
the conditions of his confinement as a pre-trial detainee (on charges later 
dismissed) on due process grounds. The Court of Appeals faulted the district 
court for not applying the Farmer deliberate indifference standard and used that 
standard in its de novo review of the case. Id. at 62-64. 
205 Id. at 66. 
206 Durrell v. Cook, 71 Fed. Appx. 718, 719 (9th Cir. 2003) (reversing 
summary judgment where defendants were granted qualified immunity because 
“a reasonable prison official could have believed the [plaintiff’s] double-celling 
arrangement was lawful”). 
207 Id. at 719 (“The computer records indicate that the cellmate had anally 
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sufficient evidence to create a question of fact as to whether prison 
officials were deliberately indifferent in double-celling the 
inmate.208 Evidence such as this will become more available to 
prisoner-plaintiffs because of the Prison Rape Elimination Act.209 
The facts of this Ninth Circuit case are considered below, in light 
of changes in prison administration that could be effected by this 
recent legislation. 
III. THE PRISON RAPE ELIMINATION ACT OF 2003 
The Prison Rape Elimination Act of 2003 (PREA) was passed 
unanimously by both houses of Congress and was signed into law 
by President George W. Bush on September 4, 2003.210 The 
findings included in the Act underscore the ways in which 
allowing sexual assaults in prisons contradicts the goal of 
imprisonment—whether that goal is viewed as incapacitation,211 
rehabilitation,212 deterrence213 or retribution.214 The PREA 
                                                          
raped a sixteen year-old boy, and showed his assaults on other inmates, and a 
threat to rape another inmate.”). 
208 Id. (“Even assuming the officers in question knew only about Durrell’s 
cellmate, there was sufficient information from which a jury could find 
‘deliberate indifference.’”). 
209 42 U.S.C. § 15603 (2005). Pursuant to the Act, the Bureau of Justice 
Statistics planned to collect administrative records from 3,269 facilities in 2004. 
BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, DATA COLLECTIONS 
FOR THE PRISON RAPE ELIMINATION ACT OF 2003 1 (2004) [hereinafter BJS 
REPORT]. 
210 Julie Samia Mair et al., National Challenges in Population Health: New 
Hope for Victims of Prison Sexual Assault, 31 J. L. MED. & ETHICS 602, 602 
(2003) (describing the PREA and reviewing some of the prior literature 
concerning prison rape). 
211 Incapacitation is a justification of prison premised on the notion that 
removing law-breakers from free society will prevent them from committing 
further criminal acts. Cf. 42 U.S.C. § 15601(10) (2005) (finding that “[p]rison 
rape increases the level of homicides and other violence against inmates and 
staff, and the risk of insurrections and riots”). 
212 The penological theory of rehabilitation is that criminal offenders can be 
more sociable following imprisonment. Cf. 42 U.S.C. § 15601(1) (2005) 
(finding that “[v]ictims of prison rape suffer severe physical and psychological 
effects that hinder their ability to integrate into the community and maintain 
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promises to make prison officials more accountable for the rapes 
that occur in prisons215 by requiring them to maintain better 
internal records on the occurrence of rape in their facilities216 and 
by urging the creation of standards for improving the management 
of prisons in which rapes occur.217 The PREA affords executive 
bodies at the federal and state levels discretion to implement 
preventive programs.218 Congress was specific, however, about 
                                                          
stable employment upon their release from prison”); 42 U.S.C. § 15601(6) 
(2005) (finding that “[p]rison rape often goes unreported, and inmate victims 
often receive inadequate treatment for the severe physical and psychological 
effects of sexual assault - if they receive treatment at all”). 
213 Deterrence is a justification for imposing imprisonment on even non-
violent criminal offenders so that they and others will abide by the law to avoid 
being imprisoned in the future. Cf. 42 U.S.C. § 15601(8) (2005) (finding that 
“[p]rison rape endangers the public safety by making brutalized inmates more 
likely to commit crimes when they are released – as 600,000 inmates are each 
year”). 
214 The penological justification of retribution does not look forward to 
possibilities of future lawbreaking, but instead views imprisonment as the 
penalty for crimes against victims or against society, or both. Cf. Farmer v. 
Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994) (holding that “[b]eing violently assaulted in 
prison is simply not ‘part of the penalty that criminal offenders pay for their 
offenses against society’”) (quoting Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 
(1981). For an example of an inmate whose prison experience exceeded the 
punishment for his victimless crimes, see Young v. Quinlan, 960 F.2d 351, 353 
(3d Cir. 1991) (prisoner convicted for using $42 of counterfeit money sued after 
he was forced to perform oral sex in prison and also tested positive for HIV 
while in prison). 
215 42 U.S.C. § 15602(6) (2005) (stating that one purpose of the Act is to 
“increase the accountability of prison officials who fail to detect, prevent, 
reduce, and punish prison rape”). 
216 Pursuant to the PREA, the Bureau of Justice Statistics shall carry out 
“each calendar year, a comprehensive statistical review and analysis of the 
incidence and effects of prison rape,” id. § 15603(a), and the PREA will also 
result in national standards relating to “data collection and reporting.” Id. § 
15606(e)(2)(L). 
217 Id. § 15606 (establishing the National Prison Rape Elimination 
Commission to investigate and then recommend national standards for reducing 
rape in prisons.). 
218 See supra note 24 (quoting authors who are concerned that the ultimate 
utility of the PREA in addressing the problem of prison rape is contingent on the 
accuracy of the data it collects and the implementation of its standards in state 
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methods it expected prisons to employ.219  
A. The Legislation and Its Implementation 
The findings included in the PREA220 indicate that Congress 
was concerned about the victims of prison rape221 and the effects 
of prison sexual assault that extend to the communities to which 
prisoners return.222 The PREA requires the U.S. Department of 
                                                          
and federal prisons). 
219 42 U.S.C. § 15606(e) (specifying the “[m]atters [to be] included” in the 
National Prison Rape Reduction Commission’s recommendations for national 
standards to reduce rape in prisons.). 
220 Id. § 15601 (2005) (“Congress makes the following findings . . . .”). 
221 Congress was concerned for the victims of prison rape particularly 
because the victims are often young offenders serving sentences for first-time or 
non-violent offenses. Id. § 15601(4) (2005) “Young first-time offenders are at 
increased risk of sexual victimization. Juveniles are 5 times more likely to be 
sexually assaulted in adult rather than juvenile facilities—often within the first 
48 hours of incarceration.” Id. 
[P]rison rape occurs every day. For example, just last month, a 19-year 
old college student in Florida, in jail on marijuana charges, was raped 
by a cell mate who was being held on charges of sexual battery. This 
rape occurred within hours of the student being placed in his cell. 
149 CONG. REC. H7764 (daily ed. July 25, 2003) (statement of Rep. Frank 
Wolf). For an example of a first-time nonviolent offender being raped in prison, 
see Young v. Quinlan, 960 F.2d 351, 353 (3d Cir. 1991) (prisoner convicted on 
counterfeiting charges for passing $42 in fake bills, sexually assaulted). See also 
WILBERT RIDEAU & RON WILKBERG, LIFE SENTENCES: RAGE AND SURVIVAL 
BEHIND BARS 91-92 (1992) (excerpting ANTHONY M. SCACCO, JR., RAPE IN 
PRISON (1975) and providing Dr. Scacco’s description of the victimization of 
William Laite, a former Georgia legislator who was convicted of perjury and 
sentenced to jail in Terrant County, Texas). 
222 The findings in the statute state that inmates who are either victims of 
sexual assault or perpetrators of sexual assault are more likely to be released 
with sexually-transmitted diseases. 42 U.S.C. § 15601(7) (2005) (“Prison rape 
undermines the public health by contributing to the spread of [HIV/AIDS, 
tuberculosis, and hepatitis B and C] diseases, and often giving a potential death 
sentence to its victims.”). In 2002, the year prior to the PREA’s passage, the rate 
of AIDS cases in prison was three and a half times higher than outside prison. 
LAURA MARUSCHAK, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, HIV IN PRISONS, 2002 5 (2004) 
[hereinafter HIV IN PRISONS 2002], available at http://www.ojp.usdoj. 
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Justice’s Bureau of Justice Statistics to collect and analyze data on 
the incidence of sexual assaults in federal, state, and local 
correctional facilities.223 The Act also establishes a new 
congressional commission—the National Prison Rape Elimination 
Commission (Commission)—to study the occurrence of sexual 
assaults in prisons, to evaluate the responses of prison officials to 
these assaults, and to make recommendations for national 
standards for prison safety.224 With “due consideration” of the 
Commission’s recommendations, the Attorney General will issue a 
final rule with “national standards for the detection, prevention, 
reduction, and punishment of prison rape.”225 The PREA also 
provides for training and education programs for corrections 
officials226 as well as grants to state prison systems to further 
                                                          
gov/bjs/pub/pdf/hivpj02.pdf (last visited April 4, 2005). The findings also state 
that because of the prevalence of rape in prison, prisoners are more likely to 
commit further crimes when they are returned to communities. 42 U.S.C. § 
15601(8) (2005) (“Prison rape endangers the public safety by making brutalized 
inmates more likely to commit crimes when they are released—as 600,000 
inmates are each year.”). “Inmates, often non-violent first-time offenders, come 
out of a prison rape experience . . . far more likely to commit violent crimes than 
when they entered.” 149 CONG. REC. H7764 (daily ed. July 25, 2003) (statement 
of Rep. Robert Scott). 
223 BJS REPORT, supra note 209, at 1. 
224 42 U.S.C. § 15606 (2005). “There is established a commission to be 
known as the National Prison Rape Elimination Commission.” Id. 
225 Id. § 15607. 
Not later than 1 year after receiving the [Commission’s] report . . . the 
Attorney General shall publish a final rule adopting national standards 
for the detection, prevention, reduction, and punishment of prison rape. 
. . . [B]ased upon the independent judgment of the Attorney General, 
after giving due consideration to the recommended national standards 
provided by the Commission . . . and being informed by such data, 
opinions, and proposals that the Attorney General determines to be 
appropriate to consider. 
Id. 
226 Id. § 15604. “The National Institute of Corrections shall conduct 
periodic training and education programs for Federal, State, and local authorities 
responsible for the prevention, investigation, and punishment of instances of 
prison rape.” Id. 
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prevention and prosecution of inmate-on-inmate rape.227 
The Attorney General’s standards will be immediately 
applicable to the Federal Bureau of Prisons.228 States that receive a 
certification of compliance with the national standards are eligible 
for grant money provided for by the Act.229 Going forward, the 
Attorney General will annually publish a report on grantee states 
that are not compliant with the standards.230 Noncompliance will 
be punished by a five percent reduction in federal funding to a 
state’s prison system, although states can avoid this penalty by 
committing the same five percent of funding toward measures that 
will bring the prisons into compliance with the standards in future 
years.231 
                                                          
227 Id. § 15605. 
[T]he Attorney General shall make grants to States to assist those States 
in ensuring that budgetary circumstances (such as reduced State and 
local spending on prisons) do not compromise efforts to protect inmates 
(particularly from prison rape) and to safeguard the communities to 
which inmates return. The purpose of grants under this section shall be 
to provide funds for personnel, training, technical assistance, data 
collection, and equipment to prevent and prosecute prisoner rape. 
Id. 
228 Id. § 15607(b). “The national standards . . . shall apply to the Federal 
Bureau of Prisons immediately upon adoption of the final rule.” Id. 
229 Id. § 15605(d)(2) (2005). “Each [grant] application . . . shall — (A) 
include the certification of the chief executive that the State receiving such grant 
— (i) has adopted all national prison rape standards that, as of the date on which 
the application was submitted, have been promulgated under this Act . . . .” Id. 
230 Id. § 15607(c)(3). “Not later than September 30 of each year, the 
Attorney General shall publish a report listing each grantee that is not in 
compliance with the national standards.” Id. 
231 Id. § 15605(c)(2). 
For each fiscal year, any amount that a State would otherwise receive 
for prison purposes for that fiscal year under a grant program covered 
by this subsection shall be reduced by 5 percent, unless the chief 
executive of the State submits to the Attorney General — (A) a 
certification that the State has adopted, and is in full compliance with, 
the national standards . . . or (B) an assurance that not less than 5 
percent of such amount shall be used only for the purpose of enabling 
the State to adopt, and achieve full compliance with, those national 
standards . . . . 
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Data collection under the PREA is scheduled to begin in 2006, 
and a report analyzing those findings will be written in 2007.232 In 
developing the methodology for this data collection, the Bureau of 
Justice Statistics has adopted definitions of sexual violence used by 
the Centers for Disease Control that encompass both completed 
and attempted nonconsensual acts.233 These definitions reflect the 
recommendations of experienced prison rape researchers familiar 
with the inconsistent data that has resulted from studies that relied 
on self-reporting by inmates to document the occurrence of rape.234 
The divergent results have in part been a result of the inconsistent 
definitions of sexually assaultive conduct used in surveying 
prisoners.235 Recognizing these limitations, the PREA supplies 
definitions of rape that go beyond forcible penetration.236 
The PREA also established a “Review Panel on Prison Rape,” 
which will hold annual hearings on the results of the data 
collections.237 The National Prison Rape Elimination Commission 
                                                          
Id. 
232 BJS REPORT, supra note 209, at 6. 
233 Allen Beck et al., Implementing the 2003 Prison Rape Elimination Act 
in Juvenile Residential Facilities, 66 CORRECTIONS TODAY 26 (2004). 
234 BJS REPORT, supra note 209, at 2. 
235 NO ESCAPE, supra note 9, at 138. “Many of the studies that found lower 
rates of abuse either expressly counted only incidents involving the use of 
physical force, or did so by implication by leaving the term ‘rape’ undefined.” 
Id. 
236 42 U.S.C. § 15609(9) (2005). 
The term “rape” means — (A) the carnal knowledge, oral sodomy, 
sexual assault with an object, or sexual fondling of a person, forcibly or 
against that person’s will; (B) the carnal knowledge, oral sodomy, 
sexual assault with an object, or sexual fondling of a person not 
forcibly or against the person’s will, where the victim is incapable of 
giving consent because of his or her youth or his or her temporary or 
permanent mental or physical incapacity; or (C) the carnal knowledge, 
oral sodomy, sexual assault with an object, or sexual fondling of a 
person achieved through the exploitation of the fear or threat of 
physical violence or bodily injury. 
Id. 
237 Id. § 15603(b)(3). 
The duty of the Panel shall be to carry out, for each calendar year, 
public hearings concerning the operation of the three prisons with the 
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also will hold hearings as it compiles its findings and formulates 
recommended standards.238 Under the Act’s provisions, the 
Attorney General must publish a final rule with the national 
standards one year after the issuance of the Commission’s 
report.239 Ninety days after the Attorney General’s standards are 
released, those standards will be delivered to state heads of 
corrections departments.240 Adoption of the standards by prison 
                                                          
highest incidence of prison rape and the two prisons with the lowest 
incidence of prison rape in each [sample] category of facilities . . . The 
Panel shall hold a separate hearing regarding the three Federal or State 
prisons with the highest incidence of prison rape. The purpose of these 
hearings shall be to collect evidence to aid in the identification of 
common characteristics of both victims and perpetrators of prison rape, 
and the identification of common characteristics of prisons and prison 
systems with a high incidence of prison rape, and the identification of 
common characteristics of prisons and prison systems that appear to 
have been successful in deterring prison rape. 
Id. 
238 Id. § 15606(g). At the time of this writing, the membership of the 
commission is comprised of: Honorable Reggie B. Walton of the D.C. District 
Court, chair; James Evan Aiken, Jamie Fellner of Human Rights Watch; Nicole 
Stelle Garnett of University of Notre Dame Law School; John A. Kaneb of H.P. 
Hood, Inc.; Pat Nolan of Justice Fellowship; Gustavus Adolphus Puryear IV of 
Corrections Corporation of America; Brenda Smith of the Washington College 
of Law at American University; and Cindy Struckman-Johnson of the University 
of South Dakota. This list is available at the National Institute of Corrections’ 
website, at http://www.nicic.org/Downloads/PDF/misc/prea_commission_ 
members.pdf (last visited Mar. 26, 2005). 
239 42 U.S.C. § 15607(a)(1) (2005). “Not later than 1 year after receiving 
the [Commission’s] report . . . the Attorney General shall publish a final rule 
adopting national standards for the detection, prevention, reduction, and 
punishment of prison rape.” Id. 
240 Id. § 15607(a)(4). 
Within 90 days of publishing the final rule . . . the Attorney General 
shall transmit the national standards adopted under such paragraph to 
the chief executive of each State, the head of the department of 
corrections of each State, and to the appropriate authorities in those 
units of local government who oversee operations in one or more 
prisons. 
Id. 
RIES MACROED CORRECTED 053105.DOC 6/6/2005 1:43 PM 
 THE PRISON RAPE ELIMINATION ACT 965 
accreditation organizations also will follow in the same year.241 
B. National Standards for Addressing Rape in Prisons 
Congress set forth with extraordinary detail the matters that the 
National Prison Rape Elimination Commission is required to 
consider for recommendation as national standards.242 Thus, the 
precise subjects of the Commission’s recommendations can be 
anticipated. Since the passage of the PREA, the American 
Correctional Association (ACA) has released its own 
recommendations to correctional agencies243 and, in accordance 
with the PREA, the Commission will consider these standards in 
producing its report.244 The PREA limits the Attorney General’s 
discretion in issuing standards by requiring that the final rule not 
“impose substantial additional costs” on state prison systems.245 
Some of the methods outlined by Congress, to establish a 
preventive approach to rape without substantial costs, are detailed 
                                                          
241 Id. § 15608(b)(2). 
242 Id. § 15606(e) (detailing the matters to be included in “recommended 
national standards for enhancing the detection, prevention, reduction, and 
punishment of prison rape”). 
243 ACA Policies and Resolutions, 66 CORRECTIONS TODAY 68 (October 
2004) [hereinafter ACA Policy]. 
244 42 U.S.C. § 15606(f) (2005). 
In developing recommended national standards for enhancing the 
detection, prevention, reduction, and punishment of prison rape, the 
Commission shall consider any standards that have already been 
developed, or are being developed simultaneously to the deliberations 
of the Commission. The Commission shall consult with accreditation 
organizations responsible for the accreditation of Federal, State, local 
or private prisons, that have developed or are currently developing 
standards related to prison rape. The Commission will also consult with 
national associations representing the corrections profession that have 
developed or are currently developing standards related to prison rape. 
Id. 
245 Id. § 15607(a)(3). “The Attorney General shall not establish a national 
standard under this section that would impose substantial additional costs 
compared to the costs presently expended by Federal, State, and local prison 
authorities.” Id. 
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below.246 
Perhaps the most effective means by which prison officials can 
reduce sexual assaults is to more carefully classify inmates for 
housing within facilities.247 This matter was cited by Congress as 
one that the Commission is charged to investigate.248 There are a 
number of inmate characteristics that wardens and guards could 
recognize as making inmates more susceptible to sexual assault.249 
                                                          
246 This note does not consider the extent to which funds could be allocated 
towards policies focused on the perpetrators of assaults. One method for 
addressing prison rapists is through criminal prosecutions for sexual assaults that 
occur within prisons. Id. § 15604 (2005) (stating that “[t]he National Institute of 
Corrections shall conduct training and education programs for . . . punishment of 
instances of prison rape”) (emphasis added); see also NO ESCAPE, supra note 9, 
at 235, 241. Human Rights Watch published a Federal Bureau of Prisons 
Program Statement entitled Sexual Abuse/Assault Prevention and Intervention 
Programs that includes a description of each prison supervisor’s “responsibility 
to ensure that the incident [of sexual assault] is referred to the appropriate law 
enforcement agency having jurisdiction.” Id. The private industry surrounding 
corrections has already begun to identify ways that states can spend grant money 
under the PREA on controlling inmates known to be threats of sexual assault. 
States Slow to Design, Implement Changes after Passage of Rape Bill: Budget 
Constraints, Even with Assistance, Slows Process, 9 CORRECTIONS PROF. 11 
(2004). Alanco Technologies Inc., a company that sells tracking devices, is 
marketing a new line of their product as a way for corrections officials to track 
the movements of known sexual predators within their facility. Security Firms 
Expect New Prison Law to Boost Product Sales, 9 CORRECTIONS PROF. 11 
(2004). Tracking devices are already being used in Ohio’s state prisons. 
Editorial, No Excuse for Abuse; State Takes Necessary Action to Stop Sexual 
Attacks in Prisons, COLUMBUS DISPATCH (Ohio), Mar. 13, 2004, at 12A. 
247 JAMES AUSTIN ET AL., NAT’L INST. OF CORRECTIONS, CRITICAL ISSUES 
AND DEVELOPMENTS IN PRISON CLASSIFICATION 1 (2001) (“Traditional inmate 
classification systems have been narrowly focused on determining the custody 
level of inmate. . . . Very little attention has been drawn to how an inmate should 
be housed and programmed once the prisoner arrives at the facility.”). 
248 42 U.S.C. § 15606(e)(2) (2005). The Commission’s report on national 
standards “shall include recommended national standards relating to— (A) the 
classification and assignment of prisoners, using proven standardized 
instruments and protocols, in a manner that limits the occurrence of prison rape” 
Id. 
249 NO ESCAPE, supra note 9, at 63. 
Specifically, prisoners fitting any part of the following description are 
more likely to targeted: young, small in size, physically weak, white, 
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Young or slim prisoners—whether homosexual or heterosexual—
face a greater risk of sexual assault in prison.250 Identifiable 
homosexuals and white inmates are also disproportionately 
targeted.251 It is indeed possible to protect vulnerable inmates; for 
example, San Francisco has implemented rape-prevention 
protocols within its jail whereby officials identify potential victims 
and segregate them from potential predators.252 
The identification of prisoners with a heightened risk of 
committing rape or being victimized by sexual assault is not one of 
the practices recommended by the American Correctional 
Association (ACA).253 Policies that would identify such prisoners 
were, however, among those previously recognized by the 
organization’s Standards Committee and were presented to 
Congress upon its consideration of the PREA.254 The low cost of 
                                                          
gay, first offender, possessing “feminine” characteristics such as long 
hair or a high voice; being unassertive, unaggressive, shy, intellectual, 
not street-smart, or “passive”; or having been convicted of a sexual 
offense against a minor. Prisoners with any one of these characteristics 
typically face an increased risk of sexual abuse, while prisoners with 
several overlapping characteristics are much more likely that other 
prisoners to be targeted for abuse. 
 Id. 
250 Josh Getlin, ‘I’m Still Fighting’; He Suffered the Devastation of 
Jailhouse Gang Rape. Now, Stephen Donaldson Resolves to Stop a Crime that 
Others Would Rather Keep Quiet, L.A. TIMES, May 20, 1994, at E1. 
251 NO ESCAPE, supra note 9, at 70-73. 
252 Lehrer, supra note 9, at 10. 
253 ACA Policy, supra note 243. 
254 Prison Rape Reduction: Hearing on H.R. 1707 Before the House 
Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Sec., House Judiciary Comm., 
108th Cong. (2003) (statement of Charles J. Kehoe, President, American 
Correctional Association), available at 2003 WL 11717551. Charles Kehoe 
gave testimony that 
ACA’s Standards Committee, in January 2003, finalized the adoption 
of several specific standards that are intended to significantly impact 
sexual misconduct and prison rape. Working closely within and outside 
the corrections profession, the Standards Committee adopted standards: 
I. to revise the intake screening requirements for all offenders to 
specifically identify those who are vulnerable or have tendencies to act 
out with sexually aggressive behavior; . . . III. to require that offenders 
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this type of policy in relation to its potential effectiveness in 
reducing rape among cellmates necessitates strong consideration of 
this practice from the National Prison Rape Elimination 
Commission.255 Prison segregation policies have been challenged 
in the past, notably by inmates with HIV, on the grounds that while 
placed in segregated housing, prisoners are denied privileges 
granted to other inmates.256 These challenges have been 
unsuccessful,257 and presumably, segregating vulnerable and 
predatory inmates also would be deemed constitutionally sound.258 
                                                          
with history of sexually assaultive behavior are. . . identified, monitored 
and counseled; and, IV. to require that offenders at risk for 
victimization are identified, monitored and counseled. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
255 42 U.S.C. § 15607(a)(3) (2005) (“The Attorney General shall not 
establish a national standard . . . that would impose substantial additional costs . 
. . . “); AUSTIN, supra note 247, at 1 (“The most dramatic impact of objective 
classifications systems has been the economic benefits reaped from our ability to 
place larger proportions of the inmate in lower custody levels without 
jeopardizing inmate, staff, or public safety.”); NO ESCAPE, supra note 9, at 146-
47 (describing the implementation in North Carolina of a pilot program whereby 
prisoners were classified by their risk of being a perpetrator or victim of rape 
and this classification was considered in their housing assignments); Scott 
Canon, Progress Lags Despite New Legislation to Stop Prison Rape, KAN. CITY 
STAR, Mar. 22, 2004, at 1 (describing “a more careful sorting of predator from 
prey” as a “relatively inexpensive” method of preventing sexual assaults in 
prison). 
256 Jin Hee Lee, Excerpts from a Jailhouse Lawyer’s Manual, Fifth Edition: 
Chapter 22: AIDS in Prison, 31 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 355, 378-80, 383-
86 (2000) [hereinafter Jailhouse Lawyers’ Manual AIDS]. 
257 Onishea v. Hopper, 171 F.3d 1289, 1292 (11th Cir. 1999) (affirming 
dismissal of claims that “HIV-positive inmates are unable to participate in many 
programs and activities with the HIV-negative, general population”). 
258 A Supreme Court decision this term regarding segregation of prisoners 
by race will affect only inmate classifications that are based on race. Johnson v. 
California, 125 S. Ct. 1141 (2005). The Court held that strict scrutiny should be 
applied to the California Department of Corrections’ policy of double-celling 
inmates according to racial classifications, to prevent violence by “racial gangs.” 
Id. at 1144. In reaching its decision, the Court maintained that the deferential 
standards of review of prison regulations established in Turner v. Safley, 482 
U.S. 78 (1987), continues to be applicable to other sorts of classifications. 
Johnson, 125 S. Ct. at 1149. The Court held “[w]e have never applied Turner to 
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The Commission also will recommend standards for the 
implementation of a “system for reporting incidents” of rape in 
prisons.259 The ACA recommends that facilities “[f]oster an 
environment in which the reporting of sexual assaults behavior is 
encouraged and reports may be made without fear of reprisal.”260 
For example, the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and 
Correction has responded to the passage of the PREA with plans to 
establish confidential means by which inmates may report assaults 
or threats, possibly through the use of a free phone line.261 The 
Bureau of Justice Statistics’s data collection will create a model of 
one method by which prisons may solicit reports of assault 
privately and confidentially. The Bureau is developing Audio 
Computer-Assisted Self-Interviews, which are computer 
questionnaires that encourage inmates to report victimization by 
neither requiring that reports be made in writing nor requiring 
revelations to prison staff.262 Although studies of the effectiveness 
of this method are to be conducted in only a small number of 
prisons, if effective, these computer systems may provide a means 
for inmates to file confidential grievances. 
Another matter for consideration requested by Congress is for 
improved training of corrections staff.263 The ACA recommended 
that prisons provide training to staff and inmates on how prisoners 
can protect themselves against assault.264 Training of this kind is 
                                                          
racial classifications. . . . [W]e have applied Turner’s reasonable-relationship 
test only to rights that are inconsistent with proper incarceration.” Id. at 1149. 
259 42 U.S.C. § 15606(e)(2)(K) (2005). The Commission shall recommend 
standards relating to “creating a system for reporting incidents of prison rape 
that will ensure the confidentiality of prison rape complaints, protect inmates 
who make prison rape complaints from retaliation, and assure the impartial 
resolution of prison rape complaints.” Id. 
260 ACA Policy, supra note 243, at 70. 
261 Alan Johnson, Inmate-Staff Relationships: Efforts Under Way to End 
Illegal Sex, Prison Chief Says, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Mar. 18, 2004, at 3B. 
262 BJS REPORT, supra note 209, at 2. 
263 42 U.S.C. § 15606(e)(2)(H) (2005). The Commission shall recommend 
standards for “the training of correctional staff sufficient to ensure that they 
understand and appreciate the significance of prison rape and the necessity of its 
eradication.” Id. 
264 ACA Policy, supra note 243, at 70. 
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currently being developed by the National Institute of 
Corrections.265 The PREA requires the National Institute of 
Corrections to make “periodic” training and education available to 
“Federal, State and local authorities.”266 
The PREA also calls for the Commission to recommend 
improved follow-up procedures for prisons to undertake in 
response to incidents of rape, including “the preservation of 
physical and testimonial evidence,” “physical examination and 
treatment,” and “medical testing measures for reducing the 
incidence of HIV transmission due to prison rape.”267 These 
measures might raise privacy concerns for prison rape victims, 
particularly those who contract HIV from a sexual assault;268 
however, courts have given prisons wide discretion in testing 
prisoners for HIV.269 If a prison pursues medical testing “for 
reducing the incidence of HIV transmission due to prison rape,”270 
                                                          
265 NIC Offers Training on Prison Rape Legislation, 10 CORRECTIONS 
PROFESSIONAL 3 (Oct. 8, 2004). 
266 42 U.S.C. § 15604 (2005) (“The National Institute of Corrections shall 
conduct periodic training and education programs for Federal, State, and local 
authorities responsible for the prevention, investigation, and punishment of 
instances of prison rape.”). Ohio has begun conducting these trainings for its 
prison staff, as well as offer orientations on prison rape to its inmates. Editorial, 
No Excuse for Abuse; State Takes Necessary Action to Stop Sexual Attacks in 
Prisons, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Mar. 13, 2004, at 12A. 
267 42 U.S.C. §§ 15606(e)(2)(C), 15606(e)(2)(F) (2005). 
268 For discussion of testing and segregation of inmates with HIV and legal 
claims that those practices raise, see Kathleen Knepper, Responsibility of 
Correctional Officials in Responding to the Incidence of the HIV Virus in Jails 
and Prisons, 21 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 45 (1995). A study 
in New York State’s prisons justified mandatory HIV testing because it 
“revealed that many inmates did not accept voluntary testing because they 
denied or underestimated the seriousness of their risk factors.” THEODORE 
HAMMETT, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, PUBLIC HEALTH/CORRECTIONS 
COLLABORATIONS: PREVENTION AND TREATMENT OF HIV/AIDS, STDS, AND TB 
1 (July 1998), available at http://www.ncjrs.org/pdffiles/169590.pdf. 
269 Jailhouse Lawyer’s Manual AIDS, supra note 256, at 372-75 
(discussing prisoner challenges to involuntary HIV-testing programs). Id. at 
377-80 (discussing privacy claims brought by HIV-positive inmates). 
270 42 U.S.C. § 15606(e)(2)(F) (2005). The Commission shall recommend 
national standards relating to “educational and medical testing measures for 
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as the PREA states, the prison’s interest will outweigh prisoners’ 
own personal rights.271 The Commission therefore might 
recommend that prison medical facilities perform thorough 
examinations and testing of prison rape victims, both immediately 
following a sexual assault and weeks or months afterward. 
IV. ANALYSIS 
The Attorney General’s final rule adopting national standards 
pursuant to the PREA will be published by 2008.272 Federal courts 
                                                          
reducing the incidence of HIV transmission due to prison rape.” Id. 
271 A Fourth Amendment challenge was made on the grounds that HIV 
testing was an illegal search, in a Tenth Circuit case, Dunn v. White. 880 F.2d 
1188 (10th Cir. 1989). The prison’s interest in providing treatment for HIV 
outweighed the prisoners’ expectation of privacy and the search was held to be 
constitutional. Id. at 1193-94. Comparing AIDS tests to drug tests the Tenth 
Circuit held that “[i]n light of the seriousness of the [AIDS] disease and its 
transmissibility, we conclude that the prison has a substantial interest in 
pursuing a program to treat those infected with the disease. . . . The alleged lack 
of a current medical response to the problem does not mandate this court’s 
forbidding prison officials from continuing to collect information on the spread 
of AIDS within prison walls.” Id. at 1196. Courts have likewise not shown 
concern for the violation of a constitutional right to privacy when the results of 
HIV tests became known to other prisoners by disclosure from prison staff. 
Anderson v. Romero, 72 F.3d 518 (7th Cir. 1995). In considering a defendant’s 
qualified immunity from suit, the Seventh Circuit considered “whether a 
prisoner has a constitutionally protected right to the concealment of his HIV-
positive status from prison staff. We doubt that he has such a right; we are sure 
that right was not clearly established in 1992.” Id. at 526. Likewise, disclosure 
of a prisoner’s HIV-positive status is not a valid claim for relief when the 
disclosure comes from the segregation of HIV-positive inmates. Tokar v. 
Armontrout, 97 F.3d 1078 (8th Cir. 1996) (affirming summary judgment against 
plaintiff, an HIV-positive inmate who challenged his segregation). 
272 42 U.S.C. § 15606(d)(3)(A) (2005). 
Not later than 2 years after the date of the initial meeting of the 
Commission, the Commission shall submit a report on the study carried 
out under this subsection to— (i) the President; (ii) the Congress; (iii) 
the Attorney General; (iv) the Secretary of Health and Human Services; 
(v) the Director of the Federal Bureau of Prisons; (vi) the chief 
executive of each State; and (vii) the head of the department of 
corrections of each State. 
RIES MACROED CORRECTED 053105.DOC 6/6/2005 1:43 PM 
972 JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY 
should be secure in finding deliberate indifference on the part of 
prison custodians if rape persists in correctional facilities beyond 
that time.273 The PREA expresses Congress’s intent to “increase 
accountability of prison officials who fail to detect, prevent, reduce 
and punish rape”274 and to protect inmates’ Eighth Amendment 
rights.275 Prison administrators should be considered on notice that 
Congress expects them to “make the prevention of prison rape a 
top priority”276 by “establish[ing] a zero-tolerance standard for the 
incidence of prison rape.”277 As greater knowledge regarding the 
prevention of prison rape becomes available throughout the U.S. 
correctional system, indifference will be the only explanation 
prisons officials have for not taking effective steps to prevent 
sexual assaults in the facilities they supervise. 
Two lawsuits currently pending in the federal courts provide a 
lens through which to view the potential impact of the PREA on 
the outcome of prisoners’ rights cases.278 The implementation of 
the PREA will provide inmates who are vulnerable to rape with 
better records of the harms suffered by victims of sexual 
                                                          
Id. The Attorney General’s final rule will be issued the following year. 42 
U.S.C. § 15607(a)(1) (2005) (“Not later than 1 year after receiving the 
[Commission’s] report . . . the Attorney General shall publish a final rule 
adopting national standards for the detection, prevention, reduction, and 
punishment of prison rape.”). The National Prison Rape Elimination 
Commission met on March 31, 2005. Expert Panel Addresses Prison Sexual 
Assaults, SOUTH BEND TRIBUNE (Indiana), Mar. 25, 2004, at B2 (reporting on a 
meeting of the Commission held at Notre Dame University). 
273 One stated purpose of the PREA is to “make the prevention of prison 
rape a top priority in each prison system.” 42 U.S.C. § 15602(2) (2005). 
274 Id. § 15602(6). “The purposes of this Act are to . . . (6) increase the 
accountability of prison officials who fail to detect, prevent, reduce, and punish 
prison rape.” Id. 
275 Id. § 15602(7). “The purposes of this Act are to . . . (7) protect the 
Eighth Amendment rights of Federal, State, and local prisoners.” Id. 
276 Id. § 15602(2). “The purposes of this Act are to . . . (2) make the 
prevention of prison rape a top priority in each prison system.” Id. 
277 Id. § 15602(1). “The purposes of this Act are to . . . (1) establish a zero-
tolerance standard for the incidence of prison rape in prisons in the United 
States.” Id. 
278 Durrell v. Cook, 71 Fed. Appx. 718 (9th Cir. 2003); Brown v. Scott, 329 
F. Supp. 2d 905 (E.D. Mich. 2004). 
RIES MACROED CORRECTED 053105.DOC 6/6/2005 1:43 PM 
 THE PRISON RAPE ELIMINATION ACT 973 
assaults,279 and with more effective administrative processes for 
reporting threats.280 Thus, for victims of preventable prison rapes, 
deliberate indifference of supervisors will be easier to establish in 
civil suits, despite the traditional deference granted to prison 
managers by courts.281 Finally, the PREA and the standards that it 
will generate should enable plaintiffs to win meaningful remedies 
that will serve to prevent prison rape in the future.282 
A. Two Current Litigants: Paul Durrell and Gary Brown 
Prisoner Paul Durrell brought suit under Section 1983 for the 
violation of his Eighth Amendment rights.283 He claims that mental 
and physical injuries resulted from an attack by his “aggressive 
homosexual” cellmate.284 The district court hearing his claim 
granted summary judgment for the defendants,285 holding that 
Durrell’s injuries were not caused by the defendants’ deliberate 
indifference.286 In August 2003, the Ninth Circuit reversed this 
decision on the grounds that an issue of material fact existed as to 
whether the defendants knew of and disregarded “conditions 
posing a substantial risk of serious harm” to Durrell.287 The court’s 
decision was based on information about Durrell’s cellmate that 
                                                          
279 42 U.S.C. § 15606(e)(2)(C) (2005). The Commission shall recommend 
national standards relating to: “the preservation of physical and testimonial 
evidence for use in an investigation of the circumstances relating to the rape.” 
Id. 
280 Id. § 15606(e)(2)(K). The Commission shall recommend national 
standards relating to: “creating a system for reporting incidents of prison rape 
that will ensure the confidentiality of prison rape complaints, protect inmates 
who make prison rape complaints from retaliation, and assure the impartial 
resolution of prison rape complaints.” Id. 
281 See infra Part III.C. 
282 See infra Part III.D. 
283 Durrell v. Cook, 71 Fed. Appx. 718 (9th Cir. 2003). 
284 Id. at 719. 
285 Id. Defendants in the case include the director of the state department of 
corrections, warden of the prison, “Captain of Housing Assignment” at the 
facility, and others. Id.  
286 Id. 
287 Id. 
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was available to the defendants. Records in the prison’s computer 
database revealed that Durrell’s cellmate “had anally raped a 
sixteen year-old boy, and showed his assaults on other inmates, 
and a threat to rape another inmate.”288 The case was remanded to 
the trial court, providing Durrell with the opportunity to prove that 
the defendant prison officials and staff had caused him to be 
housed “with a sexually aggressive cellmate” and that this 
deliberate indifference to his safety caused his injury.289 
Gary Brown, also a state inmate, is bringing a pro se complaint 
under Section 1983 claiming that the supervisor of his cellblock 
was deliberately indifferent to his health and safety and thus 
deprived him of his Eighth Amendment rights.290 In 2004, a district 
court denied a motion to dismiss his case as well as a motion for 
summary judgment based on the supervisor’s qualified 
immunity.291 Brown’s complaint is that the defendant denied his 
request for a new cell assignment, which Brown made in light of 
warnings by other prisoners that his newly assigned cellmate had 
forced other inmates into performing sexual acts.292 The prison had 
a policy of not double-celling inmates designated as potential 
rapists, but the prison’s file on Brown’s cellmate did not indicate 
that he was a threat.293 Three days after Brown’s request was 
disregarded, he was sexually assaulted by his cellmate.294 He 
brought a complaint requesting damages as well as declaratory and 
injunctive relief.295 
                                                          
288 Durrell v. Cook, 71 Fed. Appx. 718, 719 (9th Cir. 2003). 
289 Id. at 720. 
290 Brown v. Scott, 329 F. Supp. 2d 905 (E.D. Mich. 2004). 
291 Id. at 906. 
292 Id. at 907. 
293 Id. For the cellmate to be classified as a “homosexual predator” who 
could not be double-celled, required that his file have 
a documented conviction, finding of guilt on a major misconduct, or 
other verifiable supporting documentation contained in the prisoner’s 
file (e.g. jail reports) which establishes the use of force or threat of 
force to commit or attempt to commit a non-consensual sexual act with 
a victim of the same sex who is at least 14 years of age. 
Id. 
294 Id. 
295 Id. “The plaintiff requests in his complaint the issuance of declaratory 
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B. Prevention of Inmate-on-Inmate Sexual Assaults 
As the PREA is implemented, prisoners’ safety from sexual 
assault will become a greater priority for prison managers and 
staff, and inmates will find it easier to notify guards about 
preventable rapes. National standards will be set for reporting 
systems that inmates may use to notify prison staff of threats to 
their safety.296 Standards will also be established for appropriate 
staff responses to reports of threats of rape.297 If the defendant in 
Brown’s case was acting under a national standard for the thorough 
“investigation and resolution of complaints,”298 as provided for by 
the PREA, Brown’s assault would have been prevented. Both 
Brown and Durrell would also have been protected by a standard 
for “the classification and assignment of prisoners, using proven 
standardized instruments and protocols, in a manner that limits the 
occurrence of prison rape,” as prescribed by the PREA.299 
In a few federal circuits it already appears to be the law that 
vulnerable prisoners should not be assigned housing with 
potentially threatening cellmates.300 The PREA will prevent rapes 
by making more considered inmate classifications standard 
practice. In Durrell’s case, the prison’s own records revealed that 
his cellmate had a history of sexual assault.301 In accordance with a 
national standard on cell assignments designed to reduce inmate-
on-inmate rapes, such information would be accurate and would 
regularly be consulted prior to a prisoner’s placement in housing, 
rather than be consulted only in preparation for a civil trial. The 
                                                          
and injunctive relief, as well as compensatory and punitive damages.” Id. 
296 42 U.S.C. §§ 15606(e)(2)(J), 15606(e)(2)(K) (2005). 
297 Id. § 15606(e)(2)(H). 
298 Id. 
299 Id. § 15606(e)(2). The Commission’s report on national standards “shall 
include recommended national standards relating to— (A) the classification and 
assignment of prisoners, using proven standardized instruments and protocols, in 
a manner that limits the occurrence of prison rape” Id. 
300 See supra Part II.C. 
301 Durrell v. Cook, 71 Fed. Appx. 718, 719 (9th Cir. 2003) (noting that 
“the computer records indicate that [the cellmate] had anally raped a sixteen 
year-old boy, and showed his assaults on other inmates, and a threat to rape 
another inmate”). 
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guard in Brown’s case followed minimal investigative procedures 
and distinguished Brown’s request for protection from a request 
for a cell reassignment.302 Brown needed to rely upon the guard in 
his case to consider that inmate protection is related to cell 
assignments.303 Under the PREA’s standards, the duty-to-protect 
prisoners from sexual assault ought to be implicit in every cell 
assignment.304 
C. Liability for Failing to Protect Inmates from Preventable 
Sexual Assaults 
The PREA’s standards for improved prison management will 
entail more specific duties for prison supervisors to prevent 
inmate-on-inmate rapes, and the data generated by studies under 
the statute will help prisoners enforce those duties through 
litigation. As a result of the PREA’s acknowledgement of Farmer 
                                                          
302 Brown v. Scott, 329 F. Supp. 2d 905, 907-08 (E.D. Mich. 2004). 
[T]he cellmate was eligible to be placed in a multiple occupancy 
setting. Under the [state prisons’] policy, a prisoner designated as a 
homosexual predator could not be placed in a “double-bunked” cell or 
room. . . . Pursuant to [state] policy, a prisoner who requests protection 
shall immediately be placed in a temporary segregation cell or other 
suitable location. . . . However, according to the defendant, the plaintiff 
did not seek protection, but rather he requested a change in cell 
assignment . . . . 
Id. 
303 Id. at 907-08. 
The defendant reviewed the plaintiff’s cell mate’s file and found that 
the cell mate was not designated a homosexual predator, and pursuant 
to Michigan Department of Correction (MDOC) policy, the cellmate 
was eligible to be placed in a multiple occupancy setting. . . . The 
defendant states that had [Brown] requested protection, the plaintiff 
immediately would have been removed from his cell pursuant to 
MDOC policy. 
Id. 
304 42 U.S.C. § 15606(e)(2) (2005). The Commission’s report on national 
standards “shall include recommended national standards relating to— (A) the 
classification and assignment of prisoners . . . in a manner that limits the 
occurrence of prison rape.” Id. 
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and of the Eighth Amendment concerns that arise when prisoners 
are not protected against rape,305 supervisors will be responsible 
for using the newly standardized practices to prevent against 
sexual assault within their facilities.306 Those standards will be 
useful to prisoners as plaintiffs when prison officials claim 
qualified immunity, requiring inmates to show that the officials’ 
conduct was objectively unreasonable.307 Information from the 
data collections ordered by the PREA will also assist prisoners in 
overcoming the Prison Litigation Reform Act’s presumption 
against the sufficiency of inmates’ claimed injuries.308 Inmate rape 
victims will bring more successful lawsuits when the new data and 
the new standards are used, in combination, to prove the objective 
and subjective prongs of the Farmer deliberate indifference 
standard.309 
After the Attorney General issues a final rule on standards for 
the prevention of prison rape, prison managers will have the duty 
to implement practices recommended for the prevention of sexual 
assault within their facilities.310 For example, in light of standards 
for the implementation of more thorough classification and cell-
assignment systems, supervisors will have a duty to put such 
systems into place.311 Supervisory liability could attach if an 
                                                          
305 Id. § 15601(13). “In Farmer v. Brennan, the Supreme Court ruled that 
deliberate indifference to the substantial risk of sexual assault violates prisoners’ 
rights under the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause of the Eighth 
Amendment.” Id. (citation omitted). 
306 Id. § 15602(6) (stating that one purpose of the PREA is to “increase the 
accountability of prison officials who fail to detect, prevent, reduce, and punish 
prison rape”). 
307 See supra text accompanying notes 54-58 (discussing qualified 
immunity as a defense to § 1983 suits). 
308 See supra text accompanying notes 106-09 (discussing the PLRA’s 
injury requirements). 
309 See infra text accompanying notes 325-42. 
310 42 U.S.C. § 15602(6) (2005) (stating that one purpose of the PREA is to 
“increase the accountability of prison officials who fail to detect, prevent, 
reduce, and punish prison rape”). 
311 Id. § 15606(e)(2). The Commission’s report on national standards “shall 
include recommended national standards relating to— (A) the classification and 
assignment of prisoners . . . in a manner that limits the occurrence of prison 
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improper housing assignment is made by an inadequately trained 
subordinate.312 Similarly, if the Attorney General’s standards 
require improved reporting systems, supervisors will be 
responsible for maintaining truly effective systems for evaluating 
reports of sexual abuse.313 This is important for prisoners as 
plaintiffs because the Prison Litigation Reform Act requires that 
use of the prisons’ complaint processes be exhausted before legal 
redress can be sought.314 If inmates can report fears of rape 
confidentially and more easily as a result of the PREA, this 
requirement of prison litigation will be more easily met.315 
Having stated proper legal claims, both Durrell and Brown still 
faced obstacles in sustaining suits against supervisors at their 
facilities, rather than lower-level staff.316 Lawsuits brought by rape 
                                                          
rape.” Id. 
312 See supra Part II.C (discussing claims of this kind). 
313 42 U.S.C. §§ 15606(e)(2)(J), 15606(e)(2)(K) (2005). 
314 Id. § 1997(e) (2005); see also Johnson v. Johnson, 385 F.3d 503 (5th Cir. 
2004) (holding, in a prisoner-rape case, that an inmate must pursue timely 
grievances in accordance with the prison system’s formal process in order for 
the court to consider administrative remedies exhausted). “As a general matter, 
courts typically use a standard according to which a grievance should give 
prison officials ‘fair notice’ of the problem that will form the basis of the 
prisoner’s suit.” Id. at 516. 
315 Compare 42 U.S.C. § 15606(e)(2)(K) (requiring recommendations for 
national standards for “creating a system for reporting incidents of prison rape 
that will ensure the confidentiality of prison rape complaints, protect inmates 
who make prison rape complaints from retaliation, and assure the impartial 
resolution of prison rape complaints”), and id. at § 15606(e)(2)(B) (requiring 
recommendations for national standards for “the investigation and resolution of 
rape complaints by responsible prison authorities, local and State police, and 
Federal and State prosecution authorities”), with 42 U.S.C. § 1997e (2005) (“No 
action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under [section 1983], or 
any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other 
correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available are 
exhausted.”). 
316 Though the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the district court’s 
grant of summary judgment for all defendants in Paul Durrell’s case, the 
reversing decision stated that “[o]n remand, the district court is not precluded 
from dismissing those defendants who had no personal involvement in housing 
Durrell.” Durrell v. Cook, 71 Fed. Appx. 718, 720 (9th Cir. 2003). Gary 
Brown’s original complaint named other prison officials as defendants, but all of 
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victims against prison supervisors and state correctional officials 
are often defeated through summary judgments based on the 
immunity of the sued officials;317 however, the standards that result 
from the PREA will prove useful in defeating the defense of 
qualified immunity. Prison officials are granted qualified immunity 
if a reasonable official in the same circumstances would not be 
aware that his conduct violated a clearly-established right.318 The 
Farmer decision established that being deliberately indifferent to a 
prisoner’s protective needs in the face of a threat of rape violates a 
clearly established Eighth Amendment right. Qualified immunity 
will be denied, however, only when this right is violated in 
circumstances that make an official’s conduct objectively 
unreasonable.319 The issue that remains to be proven by plaintiffs 
such as Durrell and Brown is whether prison supervisors acted 
unreasonably in addressing circumstances that threatened their 
right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment. The PREA’s 
national standards will provide courts with criteria outlining what 
an objectively reasonable corrections official would do with the 
knowledge that prison rapes occur in the prison system they 
supervise.320 If the Attorney General’s standards are accepted as 
indicia of reasonable efforts to prevent prison rape, then 
noncompliance with those standards could strip officials of 
immunity when they are deliberately indifferent to sexual assault 
                                                          
the defendants other than the one official to whom he reported were dismissed. 
Brown v. Scott, 329 F. Supp. 2d 905, 907 (E.D. Mich. 2004). 
317 For discussion of the pervasiveness of summary judgments in prison 
rape litigation, see Brian Saccenti, Comment, Preventing Summary Judgment 
against Inmates Who Have Been Sexually Assaulted by Showing That the Risk 
Was Obvious, 59 MD. L. REV. 642 (2000). 
318 Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201-02 (2001). 
319 Id. at 202. When a clearly-established right is violated, defendant 
officials are denied qualified immunity where “it would be clear to a reasonable 
official that his conduct was unlawful in the situation he confronted.” Id. 
320 42 U.S.C. § 15606(e)(2)(B) (requiring the Commission to recommend 
national standards relating to “the investigation and resolution of rape 
complaints by responsible prison authorities”); id. § 15606(e)(2)(H) (requiring 
the Commission to recommend national standards relating to “the training of 
correctional staff sufficient to ensure that they understand and appreciate the 
significance of prison rape and the necessity of its eradication”). 
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in the facilities that they manage.321 
Likewise, the PREA will make knowledge about the threat of 
prison rape sufficiently widespread that awareness of the 
information generated by the Act may be imputed to reasonable 
officials. The legislation calls for standards that will provide for 
“the training of correctional staff sufficient to ensure that they 
understand and appreciate the significance of prison rape and the 
necessity of its eradication.”322 Under this standard, every 
reasonable prison guard will recognize sexual assault as a rights 
violation and know of his duty to prevent it. Supervisors of 
corrections systems will have knowledge of best practices for 
preventing rape in the prisons they oversee because the reports of 
the National Prison Rape Elimination Commission and the final 
rule on standards issued by the Attorney General will both be sent 
directly to state departments of corrections.323 The administrative 
data collection ordered by the PREA also will establish that 
reasonable corrections officials should know the objective 
indicators that prisoners are vulnerable to rape in their facilities.324 
                                                          
321 Cf. Amanda K. Eaton, Optical Illusions: The Hazy Contours of the 
Clearly Established Law and the Effects of Hope v. Pelzer on the Qualified 
Immunity Doctrine, 38 GA. L. REV. 661, 705-06 (2004) (discussing the use of a 
Department of Justice report as evidence rebutting the defendants’ motion of 
summary judgment based on qualified immunity). The Supreme Court 
“concluded that, although the DOJ’s views were not binding, nor were they 
communicated to the particular officers in question, the recommendations 
against the officers’ actions were enough to lead a reasonable officer to realize 
that [the alleged conduct] was a violation of the Eighth Amendment.” Id.; see 
also Alison Chin, Hope v. Pelzer: Increasing the Accountability of State Actors 
in Prison Systems – A Necessary Enterprise in Guaranteeing the Eighth 
Amendment Rights of Prison Inmates, 536 U.S. 730 (2002), 93 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 913, 946 (2003) (arguing that Hope v. Pelzer “expanded the 
sources of fair notice in its inclusion of the DOJ [report]”). 
322 42 U.S.C. § 15606(e)(2)(H) (2005). 
323 Id. § 15606(d)(3)(A) (instructing the Commission to submit its 
“Comprehensive Study of the Impacts of Prison Rape” to “the head of the 
department of corrections of each state”); id. § 15607(a)(4) (instructing the 
Attorney General to submit the final rule on national standards on prison rape 
reduction to “the head of the department of corrections of each state”). 
324 “The 2004 administrative collection will provide an understanding of 
what corrections officials know, what information is recorded, how allegations 
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Beyond defeating claims for qualified immunity, these same 
reports and standards may be used to establish an official’s liability 
for deliberate indifference. 
Under the Farmer deliberate indifference standard, prison 
officials cannot be held liable for failing to prevent a violation of 
an inmate’s rights unless they first are found to have been aware of 
“conditions posing a substantial risk of serious harm” to 
prisoners.325 The information that is generated under the PREA 
will buttress prisoner claims under this objective prong of the 
standard.326 The Commission will report on the effects of prison 
rape on victims generally, thus further establishing the serious 
harm that a risk of rape creates.327 Additionally, the increased 
availability of data confirming the connection between prison rape 
and the spread of HIV among prisoners could create a presumption 
that a risk of sexual assault poses a risk of serious harm.328 
                                                          
and confirmed incidents are handled.” BJS REPORT, supra note 209, at 3. 42 
U.S.C. § 15603(b) (2005) (mandating that the Review Panel on Prison Rape 
hold hearings for “the identification of common characteristics of prisons and 
prison systems with a high incidence of prison rape”). 
325 Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994). “For a claim (like the one 
here) based on a failure to prevent harm, the inmate must show that he is 
incarcerated under conditions posing a substantial risk of serious harm.” Id. 
(citing Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 35 (1993)). 
326 42 U.S.C. § 15606(d) (2005). Congress detailed matters to be included 
in the Commission’s study: 
Comprehensive Study of the Impacts of Prison Rape . . . an assessment 
of the extent to which the incidence of prison rape contributes to the 
spread of sexually transmitted diseases and to the transmission of HIV; 
. . . an assessment of the impacts of prison rape on individuals, families, 
social institutions and the economy generally, including an assessment 
of the extent to which the incidence of prison rape contributes to 
recidivism and to increased incidence of sexual assault; . . . an 
assessment of the general relationship between prison rape and prison 
violence. 
Id. 
327 Id. § 15606(d). 
328 “[In 2001, t]he percentage of deaths due to AIDS was more than 2 times 
higher in the prison population than in the U.S. general population ages 15-54. 
In 2001 about 1 in every 10 prisoner deaths were attributable to AIDS-related 
causes compared to 1 in 22 deaths in the general population.” HIV IN PRISONS 
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Increased information about the effects of prison rape will aid 
prisoners in meeting the requirements of the PLRA, which they 
must do or else have their claim dismissed.329 One requirement of 
the PLRA is that inmates claiming mental or emotional injuries 
must provide evidence of physical injury.330 For a plaintiff such as 
Brown, whose aggressor did successfully rape him, a claim of 
emotional distress relies not just on the existence of evidence of his 
physical injury but also on evidence that psychological effects 
generally occur from prison rape. When implemented, the PREA 
will provide such evidence.331 In contrast, Durrell claimed that he 
suffered mental injuries from an attempted sexual assault.332 A 
                                                          
2002, supra note 222, at 7. In New York’s state prison system, where roughly 
eight percent of prisoners are known to be HIV-positive, awareness of incidents 
of rape should be considered knowledge of conditions posing a substantial risk 
of serious harm. HIV IN PRISONS 2001, supra note 9, at 2; HIV IN PRISONS 2002, 
supra note 222, at 2 (finding that New York, Florida and Texas “housed nearly 
half of all HIV-infected inmates in state prisons in 2002”). Considering whether 
conditions of confinement amount to a constitutional rights violation “requires 
that a court assess whether society considers the risk that the prisoner complains 
of to be so grave that it violates contemporary standards of decency to expose 
anyone unwillingly to such a risk.” Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 36 
(1993). Applying this requirement to a risk of contracting AIDS, courts would 
be hard pressed to reason that exposure to HIV conforms with standards of 
decency. See Richard D. Vetstein, Note, Rape and AIDS in Prison: On a 
Collision Course to a New Death Penalty, 30 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 863, 899-900 
(1997) (discussing how the Supreme Court’s standards from the “‘disease’ line 
of [prison condition] cases” could be applied to prisoner rape and the threat of 
HIV-infection). 
329 See supra Part I.C. (discussing the impact of the Prison Litigation 
Reform Act’s requirements on prisoner suits for rape). 
330 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e) (2005). “No Federal civil action may be brought 
by a prisoner confined in a jail, prison, or other correctional facility, for mental 
or emotional injury suffered while in custody without a prior showing of 
physical injury.” Id. 
331 Id. § 15603(c)(2)(A). The Review Panel on Prison Rape established by 
the PREA will issue reports “psychological data” on “the effects of prison rape.” 
Id. 
332 Durrell v. Cook, 71 Fed. Appx. 718, 719 (9th Cir. 2003). “Durrell 
claims he was subjected to ‘overwhelming mental and emotional stress’ from 
being housed with the sexually aggressive cellmate. . . . . A genuine issue of 
material fact exists as to whether the injury suffered by Durrell was caused by 
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claim like Durrell’s will be easier to sustain after the 
implementation of the PREA, if the Attorney General’s standards 
instruct prison officials to conduct psychological examinations 
following all incidents of sexual assault, whether an assault was 
successful or not.333 
By providing evidence of prison conditions at specific 
facilities,334 the PREA also will aid prisoners in establishing 
supervisory liability under the subjective prong of deliberate 
indifference—that a defendant official was in fact aware of the risk 
to inmate safety and disregarded it.335 The data collections on the 
incidence of sexual assaults in individual prisons will provide 
officials at these facilities with concrete information regarding the 
risks faced by inmates.336 This also will be true for state 
corrections departments that receive grants under the PREA.337 In 
                                                          
deliberate indifference to his safety.” Id. 
333 42 U.S.C. § 15606(e)(2)(D) (2005) (requiring recommended standards 
for physical and mental examinations of inmates following sexual assault). 
334 Id. § 15603(b). The Review Panel on Prison Rape shall hold hearings 
for “the identification of common characteristics of prisons and prison systems 
with a high incidence of prison rape.” Id. Grantees under the PREA must report 
“the number of incidents of prison rape, and the grantees response to such 
incidents.” Id. § 15605(e). The Commission is required to recommend national 
standards relating to “data collection and reporting of—(i) prison rape.” Id. § 
15606(e)(2)(L). 
335 Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994). 
[A] prison official cannot be found liable under the Eighth Amendment 
for denying an inmate humane conditions of confinement unless the 
official knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or 
safety; the official must both be aware of facts from which the 
inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, 
and he must also draw the inference. 
Id. 
336 The reports that Congress is to receive from the Attorney General under 
the PREA will have prisons “ranked according to the incidence of prison rape in 
each institution.” 42 U.S.C. § 15603(c)(2)(B) (2005). “The first facility-level 
measures of sexual assault using victim self-reports from a national sample of 
federal and state prisoners, local jail inmates, persons held in juvenile facilities, 
and former inmates will be collected for calendar year 2006.” BJS REPORT, 
supra note 209, at 5. 
337 Grantees under the PREA must prepare reports for the Attorney General 
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addition, the national standards should make prison authorities 
responsible for maintaining records not only of incidents of sexual 
assault, but also of inmate complaints and staff responses.338 The 
defendant in Brown’s lawsuit was denied summary judgment 
because “a trier of fact could reasonably find that the defendant 
was aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a 
substantial risk of serious harm to the plaintiff existed.”339 
Inferences such as these will be more probable when reliable data 
exists regarding the prevalence of rape in prisons.The specificity of 
both the Attorney General’s and the Commission’s standards will 
ultimately determine their usefulness in holding individual 
supervisors accountable for deliberate indifference to prison rape. 
The Supreme Court noted in Bell v. Wolfish that the 
recommendations of the ACA “do not establish the constitutional 
minima” for prison officials’ duties.340 Courts may, however, 
measure the conduct of prison officials against statewide or 
individual facility correctional policies.341 The Attorney General’s 
                                                          
that include “the number of incidents of prison rape, and the grantee’s response 
to such incidents.” 42 U.S.C. § 15605(e)(1)(A) (2005). 
338 Id. § 15606(e)(2)(B) (requiring the Commission to recommend national 
standards relating to “the investigation and resolution of rape complaints by 
responsible prison authorities”); id. § 15606(e)(2)(L) (requiring the Commission 
to recommend national standards relating to “data collection and reporting of . . . 
(iii) the resolution of prison rape complaints by prison officials and Federal, 
State, and local investigation and prosecution authorities”). 
339 Brown v. Scott, 329 F. Supp. 2d 905, 912 (E.D. Mich. 2004) (denying 
the defendant’s motions for dismissal and for summary judgment based on 
qualified immunity). 
340 Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 543 n.27 (1979) (stating that “while the 
recommendations of these various groups [including the American Correctional 
Association] may be instructive in certain cases, they simply do not establish the 
constitutional minima; rather they establish goals recommended by the 
organization in question”). 
341 See Lopez v. LeMaster, 172 F.3d 756, 761 (10th Cir. 1999); Giroux v. 
Somerset County, 178 F.3d 28, 34 (1st Cir. 1999) (using a jail’s policy covering 
“Special Management Inmates” to reverse summary judgment granted to 
defendants by a lower court because “[a] juror could find that [defendant’s] 
abdication of his responsibility, in the face of such a known danger to 
[plaintiff’s] safety was a reckless dereliction of duty rising to the level of Eighth 
Amendment deliberate indifference”); Skinner v. Uphoff, 234 F. Supp. 2d 1208, 
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prison rape standards should at least be persuasive evidence of the 
specific duties of prison officials to prevent inmate-on-inmate 
sexual assaults, because those standards will be adopted by all 
penal accreditation organizations.342 The standards will be most 
meaningful—both for prevention and to victims who bring suits—
if the standards are eventually incorporated into state correctional 
policies as well. 
D. Remedies Available to Prisoner-Victims of Assault 
Under Farmer, plaintiffs may sue for injunctions or damages, 
and this new federal legislation should assist inmates who seek 
either remedy.343 As a result of the PREA, more hard data will 
become available for inmate-plaintiffs to present as evidence, 
including evidence of practices that successfully reduce rape, such 
as the programs in place at prisons with low incidence.344 The 
standards of the Attorney General could soon take the place of 
expert testimony as a means of establishing for juries that wardens 
disregarded their duty to supervise or train prison staff.345 The 
specificity of those standards will determine whether juries can 
infer deliberate indifference based primarily on prison conditions 
                                                          
1214, 1218 (D. Wyo. 2002) (using a prison’s own Administrative Regulation in 
granting summary judgment to the plaintiff class because the defendants failed 
to protect their safety). 
342 42 U.S.C. § 15608 (2005). 
343 Krein v. Norris, 309 F.3d 487, 492 (8th Cir. 2002). “A violation of the 
Eighth Amendment right recognized in Farmer v. Brennan may be the basis for 
an award of money damages as well as injunctive relief.” Id. (citing Newman v. 
Holmes, 122 F.3d 650 (8th Cir. 1997)). 
344 The Review Panel on Prison Rape established by the PREA will issue 
reports to Congress identifying “institutions in the representative sample that 
appear to have been successful in deterring prison rape.” 42 U.S.C. § 
15603(b)(3) (2005). Also, the Bureau of Justice Statistics will be collecting 
administrative records from 3,269 facilities in 2004. BJS REPORT, supra note 
209, at 3. 
345 Daskalea v. District of Columbia, 227 F.3d 433, 445 (D.C. Cir. 2000) 
(relying on an investigative committee report because no expert testimony was 
presented at trial, a jury found that “the misconduct/assault [against plaintiff] 
was effected due to, among other things, poorly trained supervisors”) 
(quotations omitted). 
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and the supervision, training or discipline in place at a particular 
facility.346 
Compensatory damage awards for negligent supervision must 
be based on physical injuries demonstrated by plaintiffs,347 and the 
Act will assist plaintiffs in proving such injuries.348 For Durrell, 
who alleged physical injuries sustained while defending himself 
from an assault by his cellmate, the ability to present evidence of 
physical injury is critical to his case.349 Under the PREA, national 
standards mandating the performance of medical examinations 
after sexual assaults and the maintenance of better records, will 
work to preserve evidence of physical injuries.350 As investigations 
and administrative records become more thorough, compensatory 
damages will be more accurately calculated.351 
                                                          
346 See Spruce v. Sargent, 149 F.3d 783, 786 (8th Cir. 1998) (holding in the 
case of an inmate subjected to repeated sexual assaults, “if a plaintiff presents 
evidence of very obvious and blatant circumstances indicating that the defendant 
knew the risk existed, the jury may properly infer that the official must have 
known”); Ware v. Jackson County, 150 F.3d 873, 881 (8th Cir. 1998) (holding 
that, on complaint against general conditions of female inmates being abused by 
prison staff, “the jury verdict is supported by substantial evidence of a 
continuing, widespread, and persistent pattern of unconstitutional conduct”). 
347 See supra note 107. 
348 42 U.S.C. § 15606(e)(2)(C) (2005) (calling for national standards to 
have prisons undertake “the preservation of physical and testimonial evidence 
for use in an investigation of the circumstances relating to the rape”); id. § 
15606(e)(2)(D) (calling for standards for the performance of physical and 
psychological examinations as follow-up to sexual assaults). 
349 Durrell v. Cook, 71 Fed. Appx. 718, 719 (9th Cir. 2003). “[Durrell] 
claims that he was injured defending himself from his cellmate, and sought 
medical attention for his injury (though this is disputed).” Id. at 719. 
350 42 U.S.C. § 15606(e)(2) (The Commission’s recommendations to the 
Attorney General “shall include recommended national standards relating to . . . 
(D) acute-term trauma care for rape victims, including standards relating to— (i) 
the manner and extent of physical examination and treatment to be provided to 
any rape victim” as well as “(L) data collection and reporting of— (i) prison 
rape”). 
351 42 U.S.C. § 15606(e)(2)(B) (requiring the Commission to recommend 
national standards relating to “the investigation and resolution of rape 
complaints by responsible prison authorities”); id. § 15606(e)(2)(L) (requiring 
the Commission to recommend national standards relating to “data collection 
and reporting”) 
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With specific practice standards in place, punitive damages 
may become more readily available to plaintiffs and could be 
assessed relative to a prison’s compliance with the PREA.352 
Credibility issues may present an obstacle to prison litigants 
seeking punitive damage awards.353 Thus, the extent to which a 
plaintiff such as Brown can demonstrate that his assault resulted 
from a prison’s noncompliance with national standards for the 
conduct of corrections officers may determine his expectancy of a 
punitive damage award. If the Attorney General’s standards reflect 
the subjects identified by Congress, thorough investigations of 
complaints such as Brown’s will be required.354 If a defendant 
knowingly disregards a threat to a prisoner in contravention of a 
national standard, punitive damages could be awarded. 
Injunctive relief and declaratory relief also will be easier to 
obtain once the PREA is implemented because a continuation of 
current practices would help to prove a likelihood of future 
harm.355 The Review Panel on Prison Rape will hold hearings for 
“the identification of common characteristics of prisons and prison 
systems with a high incidence of prison rape.”356 In facilities where 
these characteristics are present, a risk of future inmate-on-inmate 
sexual assault could be proven. Brown sought declaratory relief in 
his suit and this may be an effective remedy for a prisoner at risk 
from his housing assignment. Admittedly, it is unlikely that a pro 
se complaint to challenge a cell assignment would be heard in time 
                                                          
352 See Daskalea v. District of Columbia, 227 F.3d 433, 445 (D.C. Cir. 
2000); Stokes v. Delacambre, 710 F.2d 1120 (5th Cir. 1983) (affirming jury 
awards for compensatory and punitive damages where defendants failed to 
protect plaintiff from sexual assault in jail). 
353 James v. Tilghman, 194 F.R.D. 408, 419 (D. Conn. 1999) (affirming 
jury award of nominal damages for plaintiff, an inmate who was double-celled 
with a known sexual predator, because “there were legitimate credibility issues 
over plaintiff’s behavior and claim for damages”). 
354 42 U.S.C. § 15606(e)(2) (The Commission’s recommendations to the 
Attorney General “shall include recommended national standards relating to . . . 
(B) the investigation and resolution of rape complaints by responsible prison 
authorities”). 
355 42 U.S.C. § 15603(b) (2005). 
356 Id. 
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for a prisoner to be spared from an assault.357 Where administrative 
grievances do not satisfactorily provide prisoners with a challenge 
to their cell assignments, however, prisoner suits for declaratory 
judgment should be accepted by courts.358 Under a national 
standard for “the classification and assignment of prisoners . . . in a 
manner that limits the occurrence of prisoner rape,”359 Gary Brown 
could have filed sooner for a declaratory judgment that prison 
officials were deliberately indifferent to his reported threat. 
Inmates presently may bring class action suits for structural 
injunctive relief by challenging conditions at a facility.360 Where 
supervisors are held liable for failure to train, failure to supervise, 
or failure to discipline, it is within the authority of federal courts to 
grant injunctive relief to ensure that measures are taken to correct 
                                                          
357 David M. Adlerstein, Note, In Need of Correction: The “Iron Triangle” 
of the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 1681, 1691 (2001) 
(stating that “the mean processing time of prisoner Section 1983 suits is 181 
days”); id. (citing ROGER A. HANSON & HENRY W.K. DALEY, U.S. DEP’T OF 
JUSTICE, CHALLENGING THE CONDITIONS OF PRISONS & JAILS: A REPORT ON 
SECTION 1983 LITIGATION 21, 22 (1994)). 
358 This argument is made in regard to prisoner suits for monetary damages 
under the PLRA in Branham, supra note 101. 
Under [statutory predecessors of the PLRA], plaintiffs need not process 
a claim through an administrative tribunal if they cannot obtain the type 
of relief they are seeking from that tribunal. This interpretation of the 
exhaustion requirement, under which “administrative remedies” means 
something different than “administrative grievance procedures,” would 
also be in keeping with the different terminology found in subsections 
(a) and (b) of 42 U.S.C. 1997e(a). . . . The question raised by [the 
PLRA] is whether the deletion of the statutory predicates to exhaustion 
. . . means that a prisoner can be required to exhaust administrative 
remedies even when those remedies cannot repair or avert the harm of 
which the inmate complains. 
Id. at 545-46. 
359 42 U.S.C. § 15606(e)(2) (2005). 
360 Skinner v. Uphoff, 209 F.R.D. 484, 489 (D. Wyo. 2002) (granting 
conditional certification of class of prisoners pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(1) 
and holding that “[i]t is well established that civil rights actions are the 
paradigmatic 23(b)(2) class suits, for they seek classwide structural relief that 
would clearly redound equally to the benefit of each class member”) (citing 
Alliance to End Repression v. Rochford, 565 F.2d 975, 979 n.9 (7th Cir. 1977)). 
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Eighth Amendment violations.361 The PREA should encourage 
courts to do so. The decision in Farmer requires that an inmate 
demonstrate deliberate indifference throughout litigation and into 
the future in order for an injunction to be granted.362 However, the 
presence of HIV in the prisons makes a claim for equitable relief 
stronger, as a single exposure from a single incident of sexual 
assault can cause an inmate irreparable harm.363 If courts are to 
enforce the standards of the PREA, they will have to regard 
Congress’s intent to eliminate sexual assaults.364 By focusing 
prison officials on prevention rather than liability, injunctive relief 
can prevent further harm where officials remain indifferent.365 
                                                          
361 Skinner v. Uphoff, 234 F. Supp. 2d 1208, 1218 (D. Wyo. 2002). In 
granting judgment for plaintiff inmates on claims that prison officials failed to 
protect them from assault, the court wrote: 
Of course, the remedy ordered by this Court “shall extend no further 
than necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right,” [quoting 
the Prison Litigation Reform Act] but if it is necessary to enact 
systemic and prophylactic measures in order to correct the violations 
found to exist in this instance, the Court may do so. 
Id. (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3626; Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678 (1978)). 
362 Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 846 (1994) (“[T]o establish eligibility 
for an injunction, the inmate must demonstrate the continuance of that disregard 
[of a risk of assault] during the remainder of the litigation and into the future.”). 
363 Lareau v. Manson, 651 F.2d 96, 109 (2d Cir. 1981) (“. . . it is . . . 
unnecessary to require evidence that an infectious disease has actually spread in 
an overcrowded jail before issuing a remedy.”). 
364 42 U.S.C. § 15602 (2005). 
The purposes of this Act are to — 
(1) establish a zero-tolerance standard for the incidence of prison rape 
in prisons in the United States; 
(2) make the prevention of prison rape a top priority in each prison 
system; . . . 
(6) increase the accountability of prison officials who fail to detect, 
prevent, reduce, and punish prison rape; 
(7) protect the Eighth Amendment rights of Federal, State, and local 
prisoners . . . 
Id. 
365 Farmer, 511 U.S. at 846-47 (“If the court finds the Eighth 
Amendment’s subjective and objective requirements satisfied, it may grant 
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CONCLUSION 
Under the Supreme Court’s decision in Farmer v. Brennan, 
inmates who are raped in prison by fellow inmates may have their 
Eighth Amendment constitutional rights vindicated when they can 
show that prison officials acted with “deliberate indifference” to 
the threat those inmates faced. Obstacles in reporting and recording 
injuries, the deference typically afforded to prisons supervisors, the 
defense of immunity that is available to corrections officers, and 
the limited remedies available to prisoners have all hindered 
inmates in holding prison officials responsible for sexual assaults. 
In response to the pervasiveness of inmate-on-inmate sexual 
assault, Congress passed the Prison Rape Elimination Act of 2003 
to collect data on the incidence of sexual abuse in correctional 
facilities and to create the National Prison Rape Elimination 
Commission, which will recommend national standards for the 
prevention of prison rape. In addition to relying on the 
implementation of this Act to relieve the threat of rape in prisons, 
inmates should be able to use the data and recommendations that 
are a result of the new federal law to bring stronger claims against 
prison officials who fail in their duty to protect prisoners against 
sexual assault by other prisoners. 
 
                                                          
appropriate injunctive relief. Of course, a district court should approach issuance 
of injunctive orders with the usual caution . . . by giving prison officials time to 
rectify the situation before issuing an injunction.”) (citations omitted). 
